[Peace-discuss] Bush's 130,000 Hostages

[C. G. Estabrook]

[A persuasive analysis, I think.  How much will Bush rattle
the saber against Iran in tonight's speech?  --CGE]

  Why the U.S. Probably Won't Attack Iran
  By ANDREW COCKBURN
  WASHINGTON DC.

Jimmy Carter presented Iran with 52 hostages. George Bush has
done a lot better, sending 130,000 Americans across the ocean
as guarantees of his administration's good behavior toward the
Islamic Republic. Last week, Tehran reminded us of its ability
to make life unpleasant for US forces in Iraq by hosting
Moqtada al Sadr for a high profile visit, in the course of
which he obligingly pledged that his militia, the Mahdi army,
would retaliate for any American attack on Iran. His spokesman
quoted him as telling his hosts "If any Islamic state,
especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is attacked, the
Mahdi Army would fight inside and outside Iraq."

This warning should be taken seriously. The Jaish al Mahdi, al
Sadr's militia, has emerged as a formidable force since its
formation in 2003. Fifteen months ago, in November 2004, when
it was less well trained and equipped than today, this army
held off a determined assault by US Marines for three weeks in
Najaf.

But Iranian interest and influence in Iran are by no means
confined to the radical Shi'ite cleric and his fighters.
SCIRI, the principal party in the dominant Shi'ite coalition
that triumphed in the Iraqi elections, was after all
originally founded and fostered in Iran. Its first leader was
Ayatollah Mohammed Shahroodi, presently head of the Iranian
judiciary. SCIRI's military arm, the Badr Army, fought on the
Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq war, and was long regarded as
the direct instrument of Iranian intelligence. Elsewhere,
Iranian intelligence can look to such assets as Abu Mehdi
al-Mohandis--"the engineer"--resident in Najaf with mentoring
responsibilities for Sadr's militia there.

In the north, in and around the Kurdish enclave, credible
sources attest that Iranian intelligence has been providing
some measure of support to Sunni insurgents, including the
militant Islamic Sunni group Ansar al Islam. Indeed, the dozen
or so senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) commanders
killed in a plane crash two weeks ago, possibly including
Mohammed Sulaimani, the key Guards official involved in Iraqi
affairs, were on their way to Oroumieh in north west Iran, the
main base for Iranian operations in northern Iraq.

It may seem counter-intuitive for the Shi'ite Iranians to be
supporting groups with a militantly anti-Shi'ite agenda, but
this same regime sheltered the Afghan fundamentalist Sunni
leader Gulbeddin Hekmatyar for many years, despite deep seated
mutual antipathy.

Furthermore, power in Iran is diffused. Iraq is a huge prize,
and control of this asset, so obligingly proffered to Iran by
George Bush when he toppled Saddam Hussein, is inevitably a
matter for contention among powerful factions inside the
regime. Revolutionary Guards commanders may have a different
agenda from that of the "Etalaat"--intelligence services, or
the office of Supreme Leader Khamanei, let alone that of the
elected President Amahdinejad. Among other imperatives, these
various fiefdoms have financial interests at stake in Iraq.
Many of the IRGC commanders, for example, are "Moawedun,"
meaning they are of Iranian descent but born in Iraq, who have
property interests in Iraq.

Following the US invasion, the most influential voice in
Iranian policy toward Iraq was that of President Hashemi
Rafsanjani, who opted for limited cooperation with the
occupiers. Despite alarmist rumors circulating in Baghdad that
"One million Iranians had infiltrated into Iraq with fake
Iraqi ID cards," most of the Iranians on view were pacific
pilgrims thronging the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. The
consensus in Tehran appeared to be that Iraq should be
maintained in what officials called "managed chaos;" both to
keep the country weak and discourage a prolonged US occupation
while avoiding the wholesale disintegration of Iraq into anarchy.

However, the defeat of Rafsanjani by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
the Presidential election and the steadily escalating
confrontation with the US over Iran's nuclear program have
changed the rules of the game. Ahmadinejad is close to some of
the more radical IRGC leaders, and shows little desire to
defer to American sensitivities. His outspoken defiance of the
west over the nuclear issue, not to mention his remarks about
Israel, have only bolstered his political position at home,
while his ability to play the Iraq card should certainly give
Washington pause. As a close aide to one of the leaders of
SCIRI, which is generally considered less violently radical
than Moqtada Sadr's group, told me recently "If America
attacks Iran, then all bets are off." With such a deterrent at
hand, who needs a nuclear weapon?

Andrew Cockburn is the co-author, with Patrick Cockburn, of
Out of the Ashes: the Resurrection of Saddam Hussein.