[Peace-discuss] Zunes: The Israel Lobby: How Powerful is it Really?

[Robert Naiman]

Long, but worth it.

----

Published on Monday, May 22, 2006 by the Asia Times
The Israel Lobby: How Powerful is it Really?
by Stephen Zunes

Since its publication in the London Review of Books in March, John
Mearsheimer's and Steve Walt's article "The Israel lobby and US
foreign policy" - and the longer version published as a working paper
for Harvard University's John F Kennedy School of Government - has
received widespread attention from across the political spectrum.

These noted professors put forward two major arguments: the first is
the very legitimate and widely acknowledged (outside of official
Washington) concern that US Middle East policy, particularly US
support for the more controversial policies of the Israeli government,
is contrary to the long-term strategic interests of the

United States. Their second, and far more questionable, argument is
that most of the blame for this misguided policy rests with the "
Israel lobby" rather than with the more powerful interests that
actually drive US foreign policy.

The Mearsheimer/Walt article has been met by unreasonable criticism
from a wide range of rightist apologists for US support of the Israeli
occupation, including Democratic Congressman Eliot Engel (who accused
the authors of being "anti-Semites"), Harvard Law Professor Alan
Dershowitz (who falsely claimed that the authors gathered materials
from websites of neo-Nazi hate groups), pundits such as Martin Kramer
and Daniel Pipes, and publications such as the New York Sun and The
New Republic. The authors have also been unfairly criticized for
supposedly distorting the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
though their overview is generally quite accurate. The problem is in
their analysis.

The article has garnered unreasonable praise from many in progressive
circles, who have posted it on websites, circulated it on listservs,
and lauded it as an example of speaking truth to power. Though
critiques in establishment circles of the bipartisan US support for
the Israeli occupation are unusual and welcome, progressive promoters
of the article have largely failed to assess the ideological agenda of
its authors and the validity of their specific arguments.

It should be noted that Mearsheimer and Walt are prominent figures in
the realist school of international relations, which discounts
international law, human rights, and other legal and moral concerns in
foreign policy. The realist tradition plays down diplomacy not backed
by military force, belittles the United Nations and other
intergovernmental organizations, and dismisses the growing role of
international non-governmental organizations and popular movements.

With some notable exceptions, Mearsheimer and Walt were largely
supportive of US foreign policy during the Cold War and subsequently.
For example, during the 1980s, Mearsheimer - a graduate of the United
States Military Academy at West Point, New York - opposed both a
nuclear-weapons freeze and a no-first-use nuclear policy. A critic of
non-proliferation efforts, Mearsheimer has defended India's atomic
arsenal and has even called for the spread of nuclear weapons to
non-nuclear states such as Germany and Ukraine. He was also an
outspoken supporter of the 1991 US-led Gulf War.

It is ironic, then, that these two men have suddenly found themselves
lionized by many progressive critics of US foreign policy as a result
of their article. Any adulation should be tempered by the authors'
blind acceptance of a number of naive assumptions regarding America's
role in the world, such as their assertion that the foreign policy of
the United States - the world's No 1 arms supplier for dictatorial
regimes - is designed "to promote democracy abroad".

It is always welcome and significant when traditional conservatives,
hawks, and others in the foreign-policy establishment speak out
against specific manifestations of US foreign policy, such as when
Mearsheimer and Walt joined other prominent conservatives in academia
in opposing the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. However, such realist
opposition grows not out of concern over any of the important moral or
legal questions but out of a rational calculation that a particular
war could lead to greater instability and thereby run counter to
America's national-security interests. Indeed, Israel's violation of
international legal norms and its impact on the civilian population in
the occupied territories are mentioned in the article primarily as a
way to counter claims that US policy in support of the Israeli
government is based on a moral imperative.

What progressive supporters of Mearsheimer's and Walt's analysis seem
to ignore is that both men have a vested interest in absolving from
responsibility the foreign-policy establishment that they have served
so loyally all these years. Israel and its supporters are in essence
being used as convenient scapegoats for America's disastrous policies
in the Middle East. And though they avoid falling into simplistic,
anti-Semitic, conspiratorial notions regarding Jewish power and
influence for the failures of US Middle East policy, it is
nevertheless disturbing that the primary culprits they cite are
largely Jewish individuals and organizations.

Also problematic are the article's references to US Middle East policy
resulting in part from the influence of "Jewish voters", since most
American Jews take more moderate positions regarding Iraq, Iran and
Palestine than does Congress or the administration of President George
W Bush. Similarly, while Mearsheimer and Walt do not claim that the
Israel lobby is monolithic or centrally directed, they fail to
emphasize how not all pro-Israel groups support the policies of the
Israeli government, particularly its right-wing administrations.
Groups such as Americans for Peace Now, the Tikkun Community, Brit
Tzedek v'Shalom, and the Israel Policy Forum all identify themselves
as pro-Israel but oppose the occupation, the settlements, the
separation wall, and Washington's unconditional support for Israeli
policies.

Perhaps the most twisted argument in their article is the authors'
claim that the 2003 invasion of Iraq "was motivated in good part by a
desire to make Israel more secure". This is ludicrous on several
grounds. First of all, Israel is far less secure as a result of the
rise of Islamist extremism, terrorist groups, and Iranian influence in
post-invasion Iraq than it was during the final years of Saddam
Hussein's rule, when Iraq was no longer a strategic threat to Israel
or actively involved in anti-Israeli terrorism. Indeed, it had been
more than a decade since Iraq had posed any significant threat to
Israel, and some of Israel's biggest supporters on Capitol Hill were
among the most outspoken voices against the US invasion of Iraq.
Within the Bush administration, although the neo-conservatives who
championed the invasion of Iraq were supporters of Israel's rightist
governments, they had for many years also been supporters of rightist
governments in Latin America, Southeast Asia and elsewhere out of a
belief that such alliances strengthened US hegemony. More
fundamentally, the United States has had strong strategic interests in
the Persian Gulf region predating the establishment of modern Israel.
Indeed, oil companies and the arms industry exert far more economic
and ideological influence over Washington's policy in the Persian Gulf
than does the Israel lobby.

Mearsheimer and Walt also claim that the Israel lobby has urged
Washington to put "very heavy" pressure on Syria. In reality, the
Israeli government - fearing instability and a rise of Islamic
fundamentalism should the Bashar Assad regime be toppled - has been
encouraging the United States to back off from putting too much
pressure on Syria. Furthermore, dozens of US House of Representatives
members who voted in favor of the Syria Accountability Act in 2003
have opposed a number of resolutions supporting Israeli policies.

The authors' claim that the Israel lobby is a major factor in the
formulation of overall US Middle East policy is plainly false. Indeed,
US policy in the Middle East over the past several decades -
orchestrating military interventions and coups, backing right-wing
dictatorships, peddling neo-liberal economic policies through the
International Monetary Fund and other international financial
institutions, undermining the United Nations and international law,
and imposing sanctions against nationalist governments - is remarkably
similar to US policy toward Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia.
If the United States can pursue such policies elsewhere in the world
without pressure from the Israel lobby, why is its presence necessary
to explain US policies in the Middle East?

If the agenda advocated by the Israel lobby were substantially at
variance with US foreign policy elsewhere in the world, one could make
a strong case that these lobbyists were influential. However, that is
simply not the case. This is why some of the most outspoken opponents
of US foreign policy in general and of US support for Israel in
particular - such as Noam Chomsky, Phyllis Bennis, Mitchell Plitnick,
Simona Sharoni, Joseph Massad, Steve Niva and Norman Finkelstein -
have raised serious questions about the supposed power of the Israel
lobby, noting that it is responsible, in the words of Professor
Massad, for "the details and intensity but not the direction, content
or impact of such policies".

When it comes to US policy toward Israel and Palestine, such groups as
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its related
political action committees (PACs) have certainly influenced some
members of Congress as well as some decision-makers in Republican and
Democratic administrations. Moreover, mainstream and conservative
Jewish organizations have mobilized considerable lobbying resources,
financial contributions from the Jewish community, and citizen
pressure on the news media and other forums of public discourse in
support of the Israeli government. At times, they have even created a
climate of intimidation against many who speak out for peace and human
rights or who support the Palestinians' right of self-determination.
But all this is very different from claiming that the Israel lobby is
primarily responsible for US policy in the Middle East, even when it
comes to Israel.

What motivates US support for the Israeli government?
The unfortunate reality is that the US government is perfectly capable
of supporting right-wing allies in efforts to invade, repress, and
colonize weaker neighbors without a well-organized ethnic minority
somehow forcing Congress or the administration to do so. To claim
otherwise is to assume that without the pro-Israel lobby, the United
States would be supportive of international law and human rights in
its foreign policy.

Given that US foreign policy has rarely been supportive of
international law and human rights, except when it corresponds with
short-term political interests, why should the Middle East be an
exception? There was no Indonesian-American lobby responsible for the
bipartisan support for Indonesia's quarter-century of brutal
occupation in East Timor, nor is there a Moroccan-American lobby
responsible for the bipartisan support for the ongoing Moroccan
occupation of Western Sahara.

It is certainly true that the United States is, in the words of
Mearsheimer and Walt, "out of step" with the vast majority of the
international community on the question of Israel and Palestine. Yet
the United States is also out of step with the vast majority of the
international community regarding the treaty banning land mines, the
International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming,
and the embargo against Cuba. Similarly, two decades ago the United
States was also out of step with the vast majority of the
international community in regard to the mining of Nicaraguan harbors
and support for the Contra terrorists, as well as opposition to
sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa and allying
with Pretoria in supporting the UNITA (National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola) rebels.

Mearsheimer's and Walt's observation that US support of Israel runs
contrary to US strategic interests by stimulating anti-Americanism in
the Arab/Islamic world is not an unprecedented dissenting position.
During any US administration, there are elements within establishment
circles that come to conclusions challenging the prevailing mindset.
For example, Mearsheimer and Walt joined Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jacek
Krugler, and other realists who recognized that the invasion of Iraq
was contrary to US national-security interests, but the Bush
administration and a sizable majority of Congress (including the
leadership of both parties) believed otherwise.

Similarly, some leading realists of the 1960s, such as Hans
Morgenthau, opposed the Vietnam War, but that didn't stop an
overwhelming bipartisan majority in Washington from mistakenly
believing, at least until the late 1960s, that the war was somehow in
America's best interests. In other words, administrations of both
parties have repeatedly proved themselves capable of acting contrary
to long-term national interests without the Israel lobby forcing them
to do so.

In certain narrowly defined, short-term ways, US support for the
Israeli government does enhance US interests. In a region where
radical nationalism and Islamist extremism could threaten US control
of oil and other strategic interests, Israel has played a major role
in preventing victories by radical movements, not just in Palestine
but in Lebanon and Jordan as well. Israel has kept Syria, with its
radical nationalist government once allied with the Soviet Union, in
check, and the Israeli Air Force is predominant throughout the region.

Israel's frequent wars facilitate battlefield testing of US weapons,
and Israel's arms industry has provided weapons and munitions for
governments and opposition movements supported by the United States.
Moreover, during the 1980s, Israel served as a conduit for US arms to
governments and movements too unpopular in the United States to
receive overt military assistance, including South Africa under the
apartheid regime, Iran's Islamic Republic, Guatemala's rightist
military juntas, and the Nicaraguan Contras. Israeli military advisers
assisted the Contras, the Salvadoran junta, and other movements and
governments backed by the United States.

The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad has cooperated with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other US agencies in gathering
intelligence and spearheading covert operations. Israel possesses
missiles capable of striking targets thousands of kilometers from its
borders and has collaborated with the US military-industrial complex
in research and development for new jet fighters and anti-missile
defense systems, a relationship that is growing every year.

As one Israeli analyst described it during the Iran-Contra scandal,
where Israel played a crucial intermediary rule, "It's like Israel has
become just another [US] federal agency, one that's convenient to use
when you want something done quietly." Former US secretary of state
Alexander Haig once described Israel as the largest and only
unsinkable US aircraft carrier in the world.

One of the most fundamental principles in the theory of international
relations is that the most stable military relationship between
adversaries (besides disarmament) is strategic parity. Such a
relationship provides each opponent with an effective deterrent
against the other launching a preemptive attack. If the United States
was concerned simply with Israel's security, Washington would maintain
Israeli defenses only to a level approximately equal to any
combination of Arab armed forces. Instead, leaders of both US
political parties have called for ensuring qualitative Israeli
military superiority.

When Israel was less dominant militarily, there was less consensus in
Washington for backing Israel. The continued high level of US aid to
Israel stems less out of concern for Israel's survival than from a
desire for Israel to continue its political dominion over the
Palestinians and its military dominance of the region.

The enormous amount of military aid received by Israel annually has
been cited by Mearsheimer and Walt, among others, as indicative of the
power of the Israel lobby. Yet the pattern of this aid merely reflects
the importance of Israel to US interests.

Immediately after Israel's spectacular victory in the 1967 war, when
it demonstrated its military superiority in the region, US aid
skyrocketed by 450%. Part of this increase, according to the New York
Times, apparently was related to Israel's willingness to provide the
United States with examples of new Soviet weapons captured during the
war. After the 1970-71 civil war in Jordan, when Israel exhibited its
ability to deter Syrian intervention in support of the uprising
against the pro-Western monarchy and thus curb revolutionary movements
outside its borders, US aid expanded still further. When Israel
further proved its strength in successfully countering a surprisingly
strong Arab military assault in October 1973, US military aid
burgeoned once again.

These aid increases paralleled the British decision to withdraw its
forces from areas east of the Suez Canal. Along with the shah of Iran,
who also received massive arms and logistical cooperation as a key
component of the Nixon Doctrine, Israel emerged as an important allied
force in the wake of the British withdrawal.

This pattern continued when aid shot up yet again in 1977, after the
election of the first right-wing Likud government in Israel.
Subsequent aid boosts coincided with the fall of the shah of Iran and
the ratification of the Camp David Treaty with Egypt. US aid swelled
still further soon after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In 1983
and 1984, when the United States and Israel signed memoranda of
understanding on strategic cooperation and military planning and
conducted their first joint naval and air military exercises, Israel
was rewarded with an additional US$1.5 billion in economic aid and
another half-billion dollars for the development of a new jet fighter.
During and immediately after the Gulf War, US aid strengthened by $650
million. In the decade following - as concerns arose regarding the
threat of terrorist groups, Islamic extremists, and so-called "rogue
states" - US aid to Israel grew further still. A peace treaty with
Jordan and a series of disengagement agreements with the Palestinians
led to still additional arms transfers, despite the resulting enhanced
security for Israel.

Rather than being a liability, as Mearsheimer and Walt claim, the 1991
Gulf War once again proved Israel to be a strategic asset: Israeli
developments in air-to-ground warfare were integrated into allied
bombing raids against Iraqi missile sites and other targets;
Israeli-designed conformal fuel tanks for F-15 fighter-bombers greatly
enhanced their range; Israeli-provided mine plows were utilized during
the final assaults on Iraqi positions; Israeli mobile bridges were
used by US marines; Israeli targeting systems and low-altitude warning
devices were employed by US helicopters; and Israel developed key
components for the widely used Tomahawk missiles. Israel is also the
fifth-largest supplier of high-tech military hardware to the United
States. Not surprisingly, US aid to Israel intensified still further
in the 1990s, even as military support for Israel's key Arab
adversaries plummeted because of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the perception of Israel
as a natural ally in President George W Bush's "war on terror" has
cemented the strategic partnership still further, as the Pentagon
pre-positions equipment in Israel to enhance military readiness for
intervention elsewhere in the Middle East. Israel has also been
supportive of US military operations in Iraq by helping to train US
Special Forces in aggressive counter-insurgency techniques and sending
urban-warfare specialists to the US Army facility in Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, to instruct assassination squads targeting suspected Iraqi
guerrilla leaders.

The US civil administration in Iraq, established after the 2003
invasion, was modeled after Israel's civil administration in the
occupied Arab territories after the 1967 Israeli invasion. US officers
have traveled to Israel and Israeli officers have traveled to Iraq for
additional consulting. What's more, Israelis have helped arm and train
pro-American Kurdish militias and have assisted US officials in
interrogation centers for suspected insurgents under detention near
Baghdad. Israeli advisers have shared helpful tips on erecting and
operating roadblocks and checkpoints, have provided training in
mine-clearing and wall-breaching methods, and have suggested
techniques for tracking suspected insurgents using drone aircraft.
Israel has also provided aerial surveillance equipment, decoy drones,
and armored construction equipment. In return, Israel has reaped
ever-greater US support.

In short, the stronger, more aggressive, and more compliant with US
interests that Israel has become, the higher the level of aid and
strategic cooperation it receives. A militant Israel is seen to
advance US interests. Indeed, an Israel in a constant state of war -
technologically sophisticated and militarily advanced, yet lacking an
independent economy and dependent on the United States - is far more
willing to perform tasks unacceptable to other allies than an Israel
at peace with its neighbors. As former US secretary of state Henry
Kissinger once put it, in reference to Israel's reluctance to make
peace, "Israel's obstinacy ... serves the purposes of both our
countries best."

In contrast, Washington's Arab allies - still suspicious of US
intentions and lacking the Israeli advantages of well-trained armed
forces, political stability, technological sophistication, and ability
to mobilize human and material resources - could never substitute for
America's alliance with Israel. Since continued support of Israel -
despite its ongoing repression of the Palestinians - has not precluded
unprecedented US cooperation with Egypt, Morocco and the Persian Gulf
monarchies, few policymakers have expressed concern that the
US-Israeli alliance will interfere with cultivating even closer
strategic relationships with authoritarian Arab regimes.

In short, though counterproductive in the long term, US support for
the Israeli government is rooted in the same strategic considerations
that have led Washington to bolster other governments that violate
international legal norms. Indeed, it strains credibility to assume
that such an overwhelming bipartisan consensus of lawmakers would
knowingly pursue policies they believed to be contrary to the
national-security interests of the United States. There is plenty of
historic precedent, however, for a wide bipartisan consensus of
lawmakers myopically pursuing policies that end up hurting US
interests. While the Israel lobby certainly contributes to this myopia
through its distortions of the historical narrative and the current
situation, there are plenty of other cultural, political and related
factors also at work.

As leading Israeli academic and peace activist Jeff Halper observed,
"Israel is able to pursue its occupation only because of its
willingness to serve Western [mainly US] imperial interests" and has
in essence become "a handmaiden of American Empire". In other words,
the Israel lobby appears powerful because Israel supports US global
interests. By contrast, if Israel had a genuinely leftist government
or an anti-imperialist foreign policy, the Israel lobby would not
appear to be so powerful.

The lobby's influence on policymakers
The Israel lobby appears more powerful than it really is because its
agenda normally parallels the interests of those who really hold power
in Washington. When its agenda conflicts with those interests, its
weakness becomes apparent.

US presidents are hardly powerless when it comes to pressure by the
Israel lobby. Evidence suggests that whenever US presidents have come
to the conclusion that policies advocated by the Israel lobby were not
in America's best interests, the administration has generally won.
During the Suez Crisis of 1956, just days before the US presidential
election, president Dwight Eisenhower - fearing a radical backlash in
the Arab world if the United States failed to do otherwise - strongly
condemned the Israeli/French/British invasion of Egypt. Threatening to
end the tax-exempt status for Israeli bonds and related private
contributions to Israel, Eisenhower forced the Israeli government to
withdraw completely from Egyptian territory within months.

Similarly, when Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1978,
advancing as far north as the Litani River, president Jimmy Carter
forced Israeli troops back to within a few kilometers of the border by
threatening a suspension of some US aid. In 1981, president Ronald
Reagan successfully defeated a concerted effort by AIPAC to get
Congress to block the proposed sale of advanced AWACS (Airborne
Warning and Control System) planes to Saudi Arabia. Ten years later,
president George H W Bush successfully fought off enormous pressure
from AIPAC and delayed a $10 billion loan guarantee to Israel until
after the Israeli election, thereby ensuring the defeat of rightist
prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, who had been stonewalling the peace
process, much to the chagrin of the Bush administration. In 2004, the
current Bush administration successfully pressured Israel to renege on
a deal with China to upgrade Harpy surveillance aircraft and forced
the ouster of the Israeli Defense Ministry's director general, Amos
Yaron.

In short, the Israel lobby hardly has a "stranglehold" on US Middle
East policy, as Professors Walt and Mearsheimer claim.

Though the US bias in supporting the Israeli government and
Washington's double standards regarding Israeli behavior are
undeniable, such official US conduct is not uniquely applicable to
Israel. For example, Mearsheimer and Walt correctly observe how
Washington's support for Israel despite its human-rights abuses
against the Palestinians "makes it look hypocritical when it presses
other states to respect human rights", but there is no mention of the
equally hypocritical US support for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman, Morocco
and other repressive Arab regimes. Similarly, the authors are accurate
in observing how "US efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear
equally hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel's nuclear
arsenal". But is this any more hypocritical than signing a nuclear
cooperation agreement with India or selling sophisticated
nuclear-capable fighter-bombers to the Pakistani government in spite
of those countries' nuclear arsenals?

The Israel lobby, like most lobbying groups, is most influential when
it comes to Congress. Yet Congress only rarely plays a crucial role in
the development of foreign policy and, in recent decades, foreign
policy has become even more the prerogative of the executive branch.
Congress generally plays a reactive role regarding foreign policy.

In any case, it is incorrect to assume that most members of Congress
stridently defend the policies of the Israeli government because their
careers would be at stake if they did otherwise. Indeed, the majority
of the most outspoken congressional champions of the Israeli
government are from some of the safest districts in the country and
need no support from pro-Israel PACs or Jewish donors to be
re-elected. For example, my congresswoman, Nancy Pelosi, routinely
wins re-election with 80% of the vote and could easily stave off any
challenge from the right in her very liberal district. (After more
than a decade of communicating with her office on Middle East issues,
I am convinced that her hardline anti-Palestinian position is the
result of her anti-Arab racism, not any fear that evenhandedness would
harm her chances of re-election.)

Many of the cases frequently cited as evidence of the Israel lobby's
power to defeat incumbents who challenge the extent of US support for
Israeli policies are not as clear-cut as their proponents make them
out to be. For example, Illinois Republican congressman Paul Findley
was indeed targeted by pro-Israel PACs in his unsuccessful re-election
bid in 1982, but he was also targeted by pro-union,
pro-environmentalist, pro-feminist, and pro-Democratic PACs. He
represented a rural district at a time when farm prices were low and
he was the nominee of the incumbent party in the White House in an
off-year election. Not surprisingly, several other Republican
incumbents from rural Midwestern districts, who were not targeted by
pro-Israel PACs, were also defeated that year.

Similarly, when Georgia congresswoman Cynthia McKinney was defeated in
the Democratic primary for renomination in 2002, there were some
pro-Israel PACs that contributed to her challenger's campaign. The
bulk of her challenger's contributions, however, came from downtown
Atlanta business interests and right-wing groups incensed at
McKinney's outspoken opposition to the Bush administration on other
issues. Georgia is one of the few states that allow crossover voting,
and thousands of Republicans in her district voted in the Democratic
primary that year, providing the margin for her defeat. In recapturing
her seat two years later, McKinney acknowledged the diversity of
interests responsible for her failed renomination in 2002. Yet despite
this, some still blame her defeat, like Findley's, primarily on the
Israel lobby.

Throughout most of the 1950s and '60s, it was widely assumed in
Washington that there could never be diplomatic relations between the
United States and China because of the supposed power of the
anti-communist "China lobby". Those who raised the possibility of
normalized relations were believed to be putting their political
careers at risk. (There were even efforts undertaken to impeach
Supreme Court justice William O Douglas when he suggested recognizing
the reality of the communist government in Beijing.) However, once
president Richard Nixon, secretary of state Henry Kissinger and others
among the national-security elites realized that it was in America's
interest to open up to "Red China", there was little the pro-Taiwan
lobbyists could do about it. Similarly, if there ever came a time when
those in power in Washington decided that a major shift in policy
toward Israel was necessary, they could likely effect such a shift,
how ever the Israel lobby might react.

Mearsheimer and Walt correctly note the bias in the mainstream media,
particularly among leading columnists and other pundits, in their
defense of Israeli government policies and US support for such
policies. It is unclear, however, whether this bias is any stronger
than in other conflict regions or international policy issues in which
the US government is heavily invested.

During the 1980s, for example, it was extremely rare to read or hear
anything positive in the mainstream media about the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua. Articles documenting that leftist regime's
human-rights abuses were more prominent than accounts of the far
greater human-rights abuses by rightist regimes in Guatemala and El
Salvador. Today, negative press coverage regarding Cuba and Venezuela
outweighs any negative stories regarding pro-US governments with poor
human-rights records, such as Colombia and Mexico. Similarly, rarely
is there serious critical analysis of the neo-liberal model of
globalization or the Pentagon's bloated budget, nor are there many
positive news stories or opinion pieces regarding groups challenging
corporate greed and militarization.

This is not to say that those who challenge US policy regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict haven't been subjected to enormous
pressure from organized right-wing forces. I have often been on the
receiving end of such attacks. As a result of my opposition to US
support for the Israeli government's policies of occupation,
colonization and repression, I have been deliberately misquoted,
subjected to slander and libel, and falsely accused of being
"anti-Semitic" and "supporting terrorism"; my children have been
harassed and my university's administration has been bombarded with
calls for my dismissal. I have also had media appearances and speaking
engagements canceled, even by groups generally supportive of the right
to dissent.

(For example, in 2003, just two weeks prior to its annual meeting at
which I had been scheduled to speak on US foreign policy and
international law, the State Bar Association of Arizona rescinded its
invitation after the president and board received a flurry of e-mails
claiming that I was "anti-Israel". A few years earlier, the Oregon
Peace Institute canceled an invitation for me to speak at a forum in
Portland after similar pressure from the campaign of the First
District's Democratic nominee for Congress. And a recent peace-studies
conference at Hofstra University insisted at the last minute on adding
a right-wing supporter of the Israeli government to its plenary
program to counter my scheduled "anti-Israel" presentation, wherein I
raised concerns about Washington's role in the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process; at no other plenary session, even those involving other
left-leaning speakers on controversial issues, did the organizers at
Hofstra insist upon such "balance" from the right.)

It is important to remember, however, that those who challenge US
policy anywhere are going to be subjected to intimidation. Recent
attacks against US professors specializing in the Middle East and
criticism of the Middle East Studies Association are very disturbing,
but no more disturbing than similar attacks against professors
specializing in Latin America and the Latin American Studies
Association during the 1980s. Right-wing criticism during the 1960s
targeting Southeast Asia scholars was also widespread. In other words,
intellectuals with empirical knowledge of any world region who dare
challenge the lies and distortions of a given US administration
relevant to their area of research are going to be subjected to
intimidation.

This is not to belittle the exceptional nature of the challenges faced
by critics of US support for the Israeli government. Given that Israel
is the world's only Jewish state and that some criticism of Israel
really is rooted in anti-Semitism, organized attacks against those
opposing Israeli policies tend to carry more resonance, since they
involve alleged manifestations of prejudice against a minority group.
If a Jewish state were not the focus, many liberals would dismiss such
attacks as passe McCarthyism and would not take them seriously. As a
result, assaults on critics of Israeli policies have been more
successful in limiting open debate, but this gagging censorship effect
stems more from ignorance and liberal guilt than from any all-powerful
Israel lobby.

A related problem is that progressive movements in the United States
have failed to challenge US policy toward Israel and Palestine in an
effective manner. For years, many mainstream peace and human-rights
groups have avoided taking a public position on Israel and Palestine,
even while doing exemplary work regarding other injustices. Such
prominent liberal groups as the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy,
National Impact, and Demilitarization for Democracy have refused to
include Israel in their otherwise-ambitious lobbying agenda linking
arms transfers with respect for human rights.

And groups that do take a progressive position on Israeli-Palestinian
issues rarely make it a legislative priority. For example, Peace
Action, the largest and most influential peace organization in the US,
routinely endorses House and Senate candidates who take extreme
anti-Palestinian positions and defend Israeli occupation policies.
Ironically, the group recently posted a link to the Mearsheimer/Walt
article on its home webpage. Like many groups on the left, Peace
Action is more prone to complain about the power of the Israel lobby
and its affiliated PACs than to do serious lobbying on this issue or
condition its own PAC contributions on support for a more moderate US
policy.

Meanwhile, some groups that do challenge US policy on this issue have
accepted funding from autocratic Arab regimes, thereby damaging their
credibility. Some others have taken hardline positions that not only
oppose the Israeli occupation but challenge Israel's very right to
exist, and are therefore not taken seriously by most policymakers.

In the absence of an effective counter-lobby, the Israel lobby appears
more powerful than it really is. In addition, the myth of an
all-powerful Israel lobby is so pervasive that it has often scared off
progressive funding and organizing that could conceivably challenge
it. As a result, exaggerating the power of the Israel lobby leads to a
self-fulfilling prophecy.

The real lobby: The military-industrial complex
When examining the power of the Israel lobby in negatively influencing
US Middle East policy, it is important to recognize the role of other
lobbies that have an interest in encouraging the dangerous direction
of current US policy. Placing so much emphasis on AIPAC and its allied
groups ignores other special interests and ideologies that also play a
role in urging US support for the Israeli government.

Such allied groups include fundamentalist Christians, who believe that
a militarily dominant Israel is necessary for the Second Coming of
Christ. However, Mearsheimer and Walt mention them only in passing in
their article. The authors recount, as an example of the power of the
Israel lobby, how - after President Bush's initial call on Israel to
back off from its bloody spring 2002 re-conquest of West Bank cities
was rebuffed by former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon - the US
administration backed down and threw its support behind the offensive.
However, most accounts of Bush's backtracking attribute it not
primarily to pressure from AIPAC and other Jewish groups but rather to
the more than 100,000 e-mails received by the White House from
Christian conservatives defending the Israeli offensive.

Indeed, these Christian Zionists exercise a much more influential role
in the current administration than do Jewish Zionists. During his two
presidential election campaigns, George W Bush was less dependent on
Jewish voters than any modern president, but no president has ever
been more beholden to the Christian Right.

Other ideological factors impact US-Israel policy as well. Some older
liberals maintain an overly sentimental conception of Israel and are
defensive - out of sympathy for a historically oppressed minority and
respect for Israel's democratic institutions - regarding any criticism
of the Jewish state. And then there are anti-Arab racists and
Islamophobes who simply hate Palestinians. The American psyche also
identifies with a poor, embattled Israel, consciously or
subconsciously. Both states were founded by European pioneers, both
peoples aspired to progressive democratic principles, and both
nations' histories are replete with ethnic cleansing and widespread
repression of the indigenous populations.

But the most important special interest pressing for strong US support
of the Israeli government is the arms industry. The
military-industrial complex has a considerable stake in encouraging
massive arms shipments to Israel and other Middle Eastern US allies
and can exert enormous pressure on members of Congress who do not
support a weapons-proliferation agenda. This clout is due in part to
the sheer size of the Middle East military contracts. It is far
easier, for example, for a member of Congress to challenge a $60
million arms deal to Indonesia than the more than $2 billion in
weapons sent annually to Israel, particularly when so many
congressional districts include factories that produce this military
hardware.

The arms industry contributes more than $7 million each election cycle
to congressional campaigns, twice that of pro-Israel groups. In terms
of lobbying budgets, the difference is even more profound: Northrop
Grumman alone spends seven times as much money in its lobbying efforts
annually than does AIPAC, and Lockheed Martin outspends AIPAC by a
factor of four. Similarly, the lobbying budget of AIPAC is dwarfed by
those of General Electric, Raytheon, Boeing and other corporations
with substantial military contracts.

Contrary to many predictions, the end of the Cold War and the
significant advances in the Middle East peace process in the 1990s did
not lessen US military and economic aid to Israel. US aid to Israel is
higher now than 30 years ago, when Egypt's massive and well-equipped
armed forces threatened war, when Syria's military was expanding
rapidly with advanced Soviet weaponry, when armed factions of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were launching terrorist
attacks inside Israel, when Jordan still claimed the West Bank and
stationed large numbers of troops along its lengthy border and
demarcation line with Israel, and when Iraq was embarking upon an
ambitious militarization effort.

Today, Israel's borders are far less threatened. Egypt has honored a
long-standing peace treaty that established a large demilitarized and
internationally monitored buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula, Syria's
military has been severely weakened by the collapse of its Soviet
patron, the PLO is supporting the peace process, a peace treaty has
achieved fully normalized Israeli relations with Jordan, and Iraq's
offensive military capabilities have been destroyed by wars, crippling
sanctions, internationally monitored disarmament, and US occupation.
And yet high levels of military aid to Israel continue.

Noteworthy is the often-repeated insistence by successive
administrations and leaders of both US political parties that aid to
Israel should be increased or "kept at current levels". If the real
objective was providing adequate support for Israeli defense, US
officials would instead be focused upon maintaining Israel's security
requirements, and aid levels would vary according to those needs.
However, Israel's actual defense needs are not Washington's
bottom-line concern.

Matti Peled, the late Israeli major-general and Knesset member,
reported that as far as he could tell, the $2.2 billion figure of
annual US military support of Israel at that time was conjured up "out
of thin air". Such a figure, he argued, was far more than necessary to
replenish stocks, was not apparently related to any specific security
requirements, and had remained relatively constant during the previous
several years, reinforcing his impression that "aid to Israel" was
little more than a US government subsidy for US munitions
manufacturers.

This benefit to US defense contractors is multiplied by the fact that
every major arms transfer to Israel creates a new demand by Arab
states - most paying in petrodollar cash - for additional US weapons
to challenge Israel's increased military capacity. Indeed, Israel
announced its acceptance of a proposed freeze on arms exports to the
Middle East back in 1991, but the administrations of George H W Bush
and Bill Clinton, under pressure from the defense industry, in effect
blocked it.

In 1993, 78 senators wrote to president Clinton insisting that the
United States send even more military aid to Israel. The lawmakers
justified their request by citing massive weapons procurement by Arab
states, neglecting to note that 80% of this military hardware was of
US origin. If they were really concerned about Israeli security, they
would have voted to block these arms transfers. Yet this was clearly
not their purpose. Even AIPAC did not actively oppose the sale of 72
highly sophisticated F-15E jet fighters to Saudi Arabia in 1992, since
the George H W Bush administration offered yet another boost in US
weapons transfers to Israel in return for Israeli acquiescence.

In many respects, US aid policy serves the interests of both Israel
and autocratic pro-Western Arab regimes in that all share an interest
in curbing radical nationalism and Islamism and preserving the
regional status quo - if necessary, by military force. In addition,
for the Israelis, Arab militarism serves as an excuse for continued
repression in the occupied territories and resistance to demands for
greater territorial compromise. For autocratic Arab leaders, Israeli
military power serves as an excuse for their lack of internal
democracy and unwillingness to implement badly needed social and
economic reforms. (It is noteworthy that until 1993, the United States
refused even to talk with the Palestinians, while sending billions of
dollars' worth of military equipment to autocratic Arab monarchies in
the Persian Gulf region, which took a much harder line toward Israel
than did the PLO.) The resulting arms race has been a bonanza for US
munitions manufacturers, whose hopes for continued prosperity provide
a major explanation for US aid policy.

Though Mearsheimer and Walt observe that US foreign aid to Israel
comes out to "about $500 a year for every Israeli", they ignore the
fact that virtually all of the military assistance goes directly to US
arms merchants and the economic aid is barely more than what Israel
pays annually for interest on loans from US banks for previous weapons
purchases. In other words, ordinary Israelis never see that money.
Furthermore, for every dollar of US military aid, Israeli taxpayers
are forced to pay $2 or $3 to cover personnel, training and spare
parts.

The functions of blaming the Israel lobby
Columbia University Professor Joseph Massad - who regularly endures
attacks by the Israel lobby for his defense of Palestinian rights -
contends that the attraction of Mearsheimer's and Walt's argument is
that "it exonerates the United States government from all the
responsibility and guilt that it deserves for its policies in the Arab
world".

There is something quite convenient and discomfortingly familiar about
the tendency to blame an allegedly powerful and wealthy group of Jews
for the overall direction of an increasingly controversial US policy.
Indeed, like exaggerated claims of Jewish power at other times in
history, such an explanation absolves the real power brokers and
assigns blame to convenient scapegoats. This is not to say that
Mearsheimer, Walt or anyone else who expresses concern about the power
of the Israel lobby is an anti-Semite, but the way in which this
exaggerated view of Jewish power parallels historic anti-Semitism
should give us all pause.

Those of us who have lobbied for a more balanced US policy toward the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict have often, but always off-the-record,
been told by congressional aides - and sometimes by members of
Congress themselves - that they are not to blame for right-wing voting
records on Israeli-Palestinian issues because they are the victims of
pressure from the Israel lobby. Such claims, however, are frequently
disingenuous and self-serving.

For example, in 1991, during a meeting with a prominent staffer of
Washington Democratic senator Brock Adams, in which I raised concerns
about the senator's hardline anti-Palestinian voting record, the
staffer insisted that the senator took such positions to appease
wealthy Jewish campaign contributors. He advised that if I really
wanted to change the senator's position, I should work for campaign
finance reform. In early 1992, a major sex scandal forced Adams to
abandon his re-election bid and any hope of ever again being elected
to public office. In his remaining year as a lame-duck senator,
however, he continued to vote as strongly as ever in defense of
Israeli government policies. In short, Jewish money had little to do
with Adams' anti-Palestinian extremism. His aide, like many of his
counterparts on Capitol Hill, cynically used the age-old anti-Semitic
stereotype of "blaming the Jews" rather than acknowledging the
right-wing militarist predilections of his boss.

To this day, however, you still hear some peace and human-rights
activists quoting congressional aides and members of Congress as if
these influential and (mostly) wealthy, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
lawmakers were actually helpless, innocent victims of a sinister cabal
of rich and powerful Jews. Opposing inhumane Israeli policies is not
anti-Semitic, but when those in positions of power use an exaggerated
claim of Jewish clout to divert public attention from their own
complicity with unpopular policies, they are indeed flirting with
anti-Semitism.

Even more disturbing is the way that blaming the Israel lobby has been
used in foreign capitals to get US decision-makers off the hook for
America's controversial policies regarding Israel and Palestine.
Another prominent professor of international relations, A F K
Organski, observes, "The belief that the Jewish lobby ... is very
powerful has permitted top US policymakers to use 'Jewish influence'
or 'domestic politics' to explain the policies ... that US leaders see
as working to US advantage, policies they would pursue regardless of
Jewish opinion on the matter." Organski further notes that when Arab
and European leaders have raised concerns about US positions, "US
officials need give only a helpless shrug, a regretful sigh, and
explain how it is not the administration's fault, but that
policymakers must operate within the constraints imposed by powerful
domestic pressures molding congressional decisions."

My interviews with a half-dozen Arab foreign ministers and deputy
foreign ministers in recent years have confirmed that US diplomats
routinely blame the "Jewish lobby" as a way of diverting blame away
from the US government. This cynical excuse has contributed to the
frightening rise in recent years of anti-Jewish attitudes in the Arab
world.

Consequences could be tragic
The consequences of US policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict could be tragic not just for Palestinians and other Arabs,
who are the immediate victims of the diplomatic support and largess of
US aid to Israel, but ultimately for Israel as well. The fates of US
client states have often not been positive. Though differing in many
respects, Israel could end up like El Salvador or South Vietnam, whose
leadership made common cause with US global designs in ways that
ultimately led to untold misery and massive destruction. Israeli
leaders and their counterparts in many US Zionist organizations have
been repeating the historic error of accepting short-term benefits for
their people at the risk of compromising long-term security.

It has long been in Washington's interest to maintain a militarily
powerful and belligerent Israel dependent on the United States. Real
peace could undermine such a relationship. The United States has
therefore pursued a policy that attempts to bring greater stability to
the region while falling short of real peace. Washington wants a
Middle East where Israel can serve a proxy role in projecting US
military and economic interests. This symbiosis requires suppressing
challenges to American-Israeli hegemony within the region.

This also requires suppressing challenges to this policy within the
United States, and there is no question that the Israel lobby plays an
important role in this regard. However, this is primarily an issue of
the Israel lobby working at the behest of US foreign policymakers, not
US foreign policymakers working at the behest of the Israel lobby.

Unfortunately, Washington's agenda provokes a reaction that all but
precludes any kind of stable order that would enhance the long-term
national-security interests of the United States or Israel, much less
peace or justice. US policy has resulted in dividing Israelis from
Arabs, although both are Semitic peoples who worship the same god,
love the same land, and share a history of subjugation and oppression.
The so-called peace process is not about peace but about imposing a
Pax Americana. To blame the current morass in the Middle East on the
Israel lobby only exacerbates animosities and plays into the hands of
the divide-and-rule tactics of those in the US Congress and
administration whose primary objective is ultimately not to help
Israel but to advance the American Empire.

Stephen Zunes is a professor of politics and is Middle East editor for
the Foreign Policy In Focus project. He is the author of Tinderbox: US
Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press,
2003).

Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus

(c) 2006 The Asia Times Ltd.

###



-- 
Robert Naiman
Just Foreign Policy
www.justforeignpolicy.org