[Peace-discuss] Iran's threat? to Europe

Morton K. Brussel brussel4 at insightbb.com
Tue May 8 10:30:25 CDT 2007


Answer: NO.

Are Iran's missiles a threat to Europe?
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi
Monday, May 7, 2007
The Bush administration's plan to station interceptor missiles in  
Poland and a corresponding X-band radar system in the Czech Republic  
has triggered a major controversy. Russia's president, Vladimir  
Putin, has warned that Moscow may pull out of an arms agreement with  
Europe if the United States doesn't scrap this plan.
The U.S. government has justified this move primarily as a response  
to an Iranian missile threat to Europe, claiming, in the words of  
Robert Joseph, the U.S. Special Envoy For Nuclear Non-Proliferation,  
that Iran is capable of developing long-range intercontinental  
ballistic missiles by 2015.
Certainly, Iran has an active missile program and its military  
leaders have been publicly boasting of steady progress in the range,  
precision and sophistication of their missiles. Iran's missile  
arsenal consists of artillery rockets and short-and medium-range  
missiles with a range of up to 1,300 kilometers, too short to reach  
middle Europe.
This does not mean, however, as the United States claims, that Europe  
is at risk of a missile attack from Iran. Here is why:
First, Iran's missile program began during the Iran-Iraq war  
(1980-88), in response to the horrific onslaught of Saddam Hussein's  
missiles raining down on Tehran and other cities; a U.N. study  
indicates that Iraq fired some 516 Scud-B missiles against Iran,  
which had a limited inventory and retaliated with 88 to 100 missiles  
during the course of the war. Since then, in light of a regional arms  
race, with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states' acquisition of  
sophisticated jet fighters from the United States and Europe, Iran  
has relied on the relatively cheap alternative of missiles. These  
missiles offer an important deterrent in the event of a showdown with  
Uncle Sam because they are capable of hitting the nearby U.S. targets  
in Iraq and other parts of the Persian Gulf.
Second, Iran's medium-range Shahab-3 missiles are modeled after the  
North Korean Nodong missiles which are, in turn, based on an early  
Soviet model. Most experts agree that the Iranian missile system has  
reached its maximum potential and cannot be stretched into developing  
longer range missiles. Iran would need to master the extremely  
complex "multistage" missile technology in order to build them. So  
far, only a few countries have been able to reach this advanced stage  
of missile development and some of them, i.e., India and Israel,  
reportedly have had significant difficulty manufacturing reliable  
long-range missiles.
Third, Iran's other option of importing the long-range missiles from  
abroad, e.g., North Korea, is limited and unlikely in light of the  
U.N. sanctions against Iran and North Korea, which prohibit the  
export of missile technology to Iran. There is no evidence of missile  
cooperation between Iran and India or Pakistan, either.
Fourth, Iranian missiles are not serious threats until they carry  
nuclear warheads. But, so far there is no "smoking gun" to confirm  
the United States' allegations that Iran is working toward deployable  
nuclear weapons. In the words of the IAEA chief, Mohammad El Baradei,  
the "jury is still out" on this question. The United States' move to  
install the anti-missile system in parts of Europe is seemingly  
predicated, rather prematurely, on the failure of European-led  
efforts to steer Iran away from the proliferation path by means of  
sanctions and carrots. Iran may, after all, follow the "Japan model,"  
that is, mastering the nuclear fuel cycle and thus become potentially  
nuclear-ready, i.e., turning into a quasi-nuclear weapon state  
without actually proliferating the weapons (due to their regional  
destabilization).
Fifth, assuming that Iran manages to defy the sanctions and assemble  
a few nuclear bombs, that does not mean that it would have the  
advanced capability to develop nuclear warheads. Simple nuclear  
explosives are generally far too heavy and large for such purposes.
Sixth, the net of economic, trade and energy relations that bind  
together Iran and Europe, reflected in the multibillion dollar gas  
deal Austria signed with Tehran last month, undermines the United  
States' projection of a Europe-unfriendly Iran.
Finally, in addition to alternative countermeasures, such as  
strengthening the global export control measures, the United States  
must consider Europe's own deterrent capability, e.g., France and  
England's nuclear arsenal, that would likely exact a heavy toll on  
Iran if it ever attacked any part of the European Union. Together,  
these make Iran's missile threat to Europe a remote possibility and  
the Bush administration's defense shield in Eastern Europe an  
unnecessary overreaction.
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi is a political scientist and the author of books  
on Iran's foreign and nuclear policies.
This article appeared on page D - 5 of the San Francisco Chronicle
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