[Peace-discuss] U.S. Iraqi agreement of status of forces

[Morton K. Brussel]

A thoughtful analysis, I think, by Steve Burns.  --mkb



The US and Iraqi governments have announced an agreement for a  
complete withdrawal of all US forces by the end of 2011. As part of  
the withdrawal plan, the agreement also calls for US troops to  
withdraw from Iraqi cities by June of next year.

What do es this mean? Has the main goal of the U.S. peace movement, a  
complete withdrawal from Iraq, been achieved? The response from  
national peace organizations has been muted. A survey of the websites  
of national peace organizations found no commentary (so far) on the  
agreement.

In July, when the outcome of the negotiations was less certain,  
Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies posted a report on  
the negotiations in which she called into question the sincerity of  
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s demand for withdrawal of U.S. troops.  
She wrote: “…regardless of whether Maliki used the clearer  
"timetable" or the ambiguous "time horizon" language, what is clear  
is that a real, complete withdrawal of U.S. troops would likely mean  
the end of his power. It is unlikely that is really what he wants.”

But has the balance of power shifted since then? The Iraqi army has  
been increasingly assertive – and increasingly independent of its US  
mentors – in recent months, and Maliki may no longer feel the need  
for US military support to maintain his hold on power. If so, he may  
now see the U.S. as a source of interference in his own efforts to  
consolidate power. Recently, for example, the U.S. and Iraqi  
governments have come into conflict about U.S. support for Iraqi  
“Awakening Councils”, composed of predominantly Sunni former members  
of the insurgency. Along with payments from the U.S. of $300 a month,  
the members of these groups were promised jobs in the Iraqi army. But  
now, the Iraqi government has been targeting their members for  
arrest, forcing them to disarm, and barring them from the army.

A newly assertive Iraqi army may not need as many Americans kicking  
down the doors of Iraqi homes and placing sandbags on the heads of  
the people they find inside – preferring to do the job themselves –  
but they will certainly want to maintain access to America’s “shock  
and awe” airpower. So an agreement for U.S. forces to withdraw from  
Iraqi cities will be a positive development in some respects (for  
example, we might see fewer Iraqi taxicabs run over by tanks just for  
fun) but it also likely means a huge escalation in the use of aerial  
bombing. And without U.S. troops on the ground to direct the fire,  
with the Maliki government able to call in airstrikes – unchecked -  
whenever it deems necessary, we could see the U.S. Air Force turned  
into even more of a tool for sectarian warfare.

Then there’s the matter of the timetable. December 2011 is more than  
twice as long as Obama’s proposed 16 month withdrawal timetable, but  
Obama is only calling for a partial withdrawal that would leave a  
“residual force” of US troops in Iraq, while the Iraqi government  
appear to be calling for a complete withdrawal. In any event, this is  
a much longer withdrawal timetable than the one demanded by a large  
majority of the Iraqi people, 70% of whom want all U.S. troops out in  
a year or less.

Will the Bush-Maliki agreement go forward? An AFP report on the  
agreement states that “The [Iraqi] parliamentary stamp is a crucial  
legal requirement,” and quotes Iraqi parliament speaker Mahmud  
Mashhadani saying “Iraq's lawmakers would never endorse it in its  
current form.” If the Iraqi parliament refuses to approve a plan that  
calls for a three-year withdrawal timetable, what happens then? The  
feverish negotiations between the Bush and Maliki administrations are  
motivated by the knowledge that U.S. forces remain in Iraq under a  
year-to-year mandate from the UN Security Council which expires in  
December and is not likely to be renewed. Failure to come to an  
agreement by the end of the year means that U.S. troops remain in  
Iraq without any legal basis for the occupation. Not that  
international law has ever been an impediment to the U.S. doing what  
it wants, but this is a complication the U.S. would prefer to avoid,  
if possible.

Knowing that the clock is ticking on the U.S. occupation, nationalist  
members of the Iraqi parliament may decide that it’s in their  
interest to delay ratification until after the U.S. election, to see  
if they can force a better deal out of the next administration. (As  
an aside, the same article says that “U.S. lawmakers would not be  
asked to approve the pact,” showing that while Iraqi lawmakers insist  
on their right to ratify agreements their government makes with a  
foreign government, our Congress doesn’t see a need to act as a  
similar check on our own imperial President.)

All of this presents a significant challenge to the US peace  
movement. If the U.S. and Iraqi governments are able to come to an  
agreement on a complete withdrawal – but not on a timetable to our  
liking – then our position gets reduced to: “Yes, but.” As in: “Yes,  
but it’s not happening fast enough.” It may prove to be difficult to  
motivate people to take to the streets over the difference between a  
one-year withdrawal plan and a two-year withdrawal plan, especially  
if U.S. troops have been withdrawn to bases and are experiencing  
greatly reduced casualty rates.

This recalls President Nixon’s “Vietnamization” plan, which combined  
a partial withdrawal of U.S. ground troops with a huge escalation in  
bombing, and massive transfers of weapons to the South Vietnamese  
military. There’s no denying that this had a dampening effect on  
domestic opposition to the war. But there’s a major difference this  
time around: Vietnamization was bound to fail, because the U.S. was  
propping up a puppet regime that had no ability to stand on its own.  
Maliki’s government, with its base among Iraq’s majority Shiite  
population, is no mere puppet of the U.S.

It now seems clear that Iraq won’t end as Vietnam did, with Americans  
and their collaborators being plucked from the roof of the U.S.  
embassy by helicopters. Instead, our occupation of Iraq may end  
without a clear defeat for the US, but with an outcome that could  
hardly be considered a victory, either. When the U.S. invaded Iraq,  
the neoconservatives in the Bush administration had dreams of a  
strong US ally in the Middle East, giant and permanent U.S. military  
bases, and a privatized “free market” economy that would be a model  
to other Middle Eastern states. If Maliki gets his way, the U.S. will  
have failed to achieve all of these goals, and at a cost of trillions  
of dollars and thousands of (U.S.) lives.

Both Iraq war supporters and opponents of the war will try to put  
their own spin on the outcome, of course. No amount of positive spin  
is going to make the American people eager to repeat the Iraq  
experience, but a key question for the peace movement is the extent  
to which the millions of Americans who marched against the war see  
their own actions as resulting in the end of the war. When U.S.  
forces finally left Vietnam, millions of Americans, mostly young  
people, felt that their actions had played a role in ending the war.  
These young people took that sense of confidence in their own ability  
to effect change into other struggles for social and environmental  
justice, and many of them still constitute the core of the peace  
movement today. If our occupation of Iraq ends with an orderly  
withdrawal resulting from a signed contract between U.S. and Iraqi  
elites, will the rank and file of today’s peace movement feel they  
had any role in the outcome? Future struggles for peace and justice  
depend on the answer to that question.

Please comment at: http://wisconsinpeaceandjustice.blogspot.com/

Steve Burns
Wisconsin Network for Peace and Justice
122 State St. #402
Madison, WI 53703
(608) 250 9240
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