[Peace-discuss] Who's sitting on the SOFA?

Sun Oct 26 23:15:50 CDT 2008

[Two contrasting accounts of the "Status of Forces Agreement [sic]" that the USG 
is trying to force on its reluctant puppet, the government of Iraq. Stuart and I 
described them, respectively, at tonight's AWARE meeting. I think we'll know 
fairly soon which is the more accurate account.  My view, subject to the stern 
correction of reality, is that Porter errs on the side of optimism, and that the 
US is unlikely to leave Iraq in any but a token fashion any time soon.  --CGE]

	=====[1]=====

  	Inter Press Service News Agency 	
	Monday, October 27, 2008   03:55 GMT
	Final Text of Iraq Pact Reveals a U.S. Debacle
	Analysis by Gareth Porter*

WASHINGTON, Oct 22 (IPS) - The final draft of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces 
agreement on the U.S. military presence represents an even more crushing defeat 
for the policy of the George W. Bush administration than previously thought, the 
final text reveals.

The final draft, dated Oct. 13, not only imposes unambiguous deadlines for 
withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by 2011 but makes it extremely unlikely that a 
U.S. non-combat presence will be allowed to remain in Iraq for training and 
support purposes beyond the 2011 deadline for withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces.

Furthermore, Shiite opposition to the pact as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty 
makes the prospects for passage of even this agreement by the Iraqi parliament 
doubtful. Pro-government Shiite parties, the top Shiite clerical body in the 
country, and a powerful movement led by nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr that 
recently mobilised hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in protest against the 
pact, are all calling for its defeat.

At an Iraqi cabinet meeting Tuesday, ministers raised objections to the final 
draft, and a government spokesman said that the agreement would not submit it to 
the parliament in its current form. But Secretary of Defence Robert Gates told 
three news agencies Tuesday that the door was "pretty far closed" on further 
negotiations.

In the absence of an agreement approved by the Iraqi parliament, U.S. troops in 
Iraq will probably be confined to their bases once the United Nations mandate 
expires Dec. 31.

The clearest sign of the dramatically reduced U.S. negotiating power in the 
final draft is the willingness of the United States to give up extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and their employees and over U.S. troops in 
the case of "major and intentional crimes" that occur outside bases and while 
off duty. The United States has never allowed a foreign country to have 
jurisdiction over its troops in any previous status of forces agreement.

But even that concession is not enough to satisfy anti-occupation sentiments 
across all Shiite political parties. Sunni politicians hold less decisive views 
on the pact, and Kurds are supportive.

Bush administration policymakers did not imagine when the negotiations began 
formally last March that its bargaining position on the issue of the U.S. 
military presence could have turned out to be so weak in relation with its own 
"client" regime in Baghdad.

They were confident of being able to legitimise a U.S. presence in Iraq for 
decades after the fighting had ended, just as they did in South Korea. Secretary 
of Defence Robert Gates had declared in June 2007 that U.S. troops would be in 
Iraq "for a protracted period of time".

The secret U.S. draft handed to Iraqi officials Mar. 7 put no limit on either 
the number of U.S. troops in Iraq or the duration of their presence or their 
activities. It would have authorised U.S. forces to "conduct military operations 
in Iraq and to detain certain individuals when necessary for imperative reasons 
of security", according to an Apr. 8 article in The Guardian quoting from a 
leaked copy of the draft.

When Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki demanded a timetable for complete U.S. 
withdrawal in early July, the White House insisted that it would not accept such 
a timetable and that any decision on withdrawal "will be conditions based". It 
was even hoping to avoid a requirement for complete withdrawal in the agreement, 
as reflected in false claims to media Jul. 17 that Bush and Maliki had agreed on 
the objective of "further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq" rather than 
complete withdrawal.

By early August, however, Bush had already reduced its negotiating aims. The 
U.S. draft dated Aug. 6, which was translated and posted on the internet by 
Iraqi activist Raed Jarrar, demanded the inclusion of either "targeted times" or 
"time targets" to refer to the dates for withdrawal of U.S. forces from all 
cities, town and villages and for complete combat troop withdrawal from Iraq, 
suggesting that they were not deadlines.

When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Baghdad Aug. 21, the United 
States accepted for the first time a firm date of 2011 for complete withdrawal, 
giving up the demand for ambiguous such terms. However, the Aug. 6 draft 
included a provision that the U.S. could ask Iraq to "extend" the date for 
complete withdrawal of combat troops, based on mutual review of "progress" in 
achieving the withdrawal.

Because it had not yet been removed from the text, U.S. officials continued to 
claim to reporters that the date was "conditions-based", as Karen DeYoung 
reported in the Washington Post Aug. 22.

The administration also continued to hope for approval of a residual force. U.S. 
officials told DeYoung the deal would leave "tens of thousands of U.S. troops 
inside Iraq in supporting roles...for an unspecified time". That hope was based 
on a paragraph of the Aug. 6 draft providing that the Iraqi government could 
request such a force, with the joint committee for operations and coordination 
determining the "tasks and level of the troops..."

But the Oct. 13 final draft, a translation of which was posted by Raed Jarrar on 
his website Oct. 20, reveals that the Bush administration has been forced to 
give up its aims of softening the deadline for withdrawal and of a residual 
non-combat force in the country. Unlike the Aug. 6 draft, the final text treats 
any extension of that date as a modification of the agreement, which could be 
done only "in accordance to constitutional procedures in both countries".

That is an obvious reference to approval by the Iraqi parliament.

Given the present level of opposition to the agreement within the Shiite 
community, that provision offers scant hope of a residual U.S. non-combat force 
in Iraq after 2011.

Another signal of Iraqi intentions is a provision of the final draft limiting 
the duration of the agreement to three years -- a date coinciding with the 
deadline for complete withdrawal from Iraq. The date can be extended only by a 
decision made by the "constitutional procedures in both countries".

The final draft confirms the language of the Aug. 6 draft requiring that all 
U.S. military operations be subject to the approval of the Iraqi government and 
coordinated with Iraqi authorities through a joint U.S.-Iraqi committee.

The negotiating text had already established by Aug. 6 that U.S. troops could 
not detain anyone in the country without a "warrant issued by the specialised 
Iraqi authorities in accordance with Iraqi law" and required that the detainees 
be turned over to Iraqi authorities within 24 hours. The Oct. 13 "final draft" 
goes even further, requiring that any detention by the United States, apart from 
its own personnel, must be "based on an Iraqi decision".

The collapse of the Bush administration's ambitious plan for a long-term U.S. 
presence in Iraq highlights the degree of unreality that has prevailed among top 
U.S. officials in both Washington and Baghdad on Iraqi politics. They continued 
to see the Maliki regime as a client which would cooperate with U.S. aims even 
after it was clear that Maliki's agenda was sharply at odds with that of the 
United States.

They also refused to take seriously the opposition to such a presence even among 
the Shiite clerics who had tolerated it in order to obtain Shiite control over 
state power.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. 
national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of 
Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 
2006.

	=====[2]=====

	'Sub rosa SOFA brings darkness to Iraq'
	Sun, 26 Oct 2008 16:13:07 GMT

The controversial US-Iraq security agreement includes 'some secret provisions', 
which would flagrantly violate Iraq's sovereignty.

Secret provisions have been incorporated in the so-called Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), which would violate Iraq's sovereignty in a more direct manner 
than the provisions disclosed by the Iraqi media, the Saudi daily Okaz reported 
on Sunday, citing "informed political sources".

According to the report, although "the secret provisions" would have more 
adverse consequences for Iraq in terms of the country's sovereignty and 
independence, a majority of Iraqi lawmakers have been kept entirely unaware of them.

Based on those provisions, the US would be granted the permission to build 
military bases, camps and prisons inside Iraq. The scope of the immunity from 
legal prosecution for the US forces--the most controversial provision of SOFA-- 
would also be extended to include all US security, military and civilian firms 
as well as the US army's contractors.

Under the terms of SOFA, Iraqi officials would be prohibited from meddling in 
operations carried out by US forces or limiting their authority. The US would 
also be allowed to attack any country, which "represents a security threat to 
Iraq" from the country's soil.

After signing the deal, Baghdad would be obliged to ask for Washington's 
approval before concluding any regional or international agreements with third 
countries.

According to the Okaz report, SOFA would bring the Iraqi key ministries of 
defense and interior under US control for 10 years to facilitate "the training 
of the Iraqi forces."

The Saudi newspaper also claimed that under the secret provisions, no timetable 
would be set for the withdrawal of US troops form Iraq and any pull-out would 
depend on several conditions.

The conditions for any US withdrawal include the readiness of Iraqi forces, the 
success in fighting terrorism, the removal of "the neighboring countries' 
security threats", national reconciliation and a consensus among all Iraqi 
political groups on the issue. Washington would be entitled to stay in Iraq, if 
even one of those conditions were not fulfilled.

Based on those SOFA provisions which have made public, the US forces must leave 
the war-torn country by early 2011 without any preconditions.

The report also ruled out the possibility that the US and Iraq would reach an 
agreement before the term of US President George W. Bush in office ends.

The failure to sign the deal, according to the daily, should be considered as a 
setback for the Bush administration which is seeking to play the card of SOFA to 
strengthen the position of the Republican Party before the upcoming US 
presidential elections.

http://www.presstv.ir/Detail.aspx?id=73339&sectionid=351020201

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