[Peace-discuss] Who's sitting on the SOFA?

[Robert Naiman]

Even the Saudi newspaper account - as recounted by the Iranian state
Press TV - says "The failure to sign the deal, according to the daily,
should be considered as a setback for the Bush administration" - so
maybe there is not that much difference between the two pieces - since
that is the main point of the Porter piece - that the fate of the
"SOFA" agreement shows that the neocon project in Iraq has hit a wall.

The Saudi newspaper account refers to "secret provisions," but the
Maliki government is unwilling to defend even the public provisions,
having called them "unacceptable," and apparently they have indicated
that they have no intention of signing the agreement as is.

Porter had reported earlier that the Iraqi government was in favor of
the Obama timetable but agreed to a longer timetable at the behest of
the Bush Administration, for US electoral reasons, now largely moot.

The Iraqi government appears to have calculated, correctly as far as I
can tell, that time is on their side. There is no reason to approve
the Bush agreement before the US election - they can get a better deal
from an Obama Administration, or from a lame duck Bush Administration,
or from the UN Security Council. Russia, as it has clearly indicated,
would be only too happy to extend the current UN mandate, in order to
give the Iraqi government more bargaining power against the US.

On Sun, Oct 26, 2008 at 11:15 PM, C. G. Estabrook <galliher at uiuc.edu> wrote:
> [Two contrasting accounts of the "Status of Forces Agreement [sic]" that the
> USG is trying to force on its reluctant puppet, the government of Iraq.
> Stuart and I described them, respectively, at tonight's AWARE meeting. I
> think we'll know fairly soon which is the more accurate account.  My view,
> subject to the stern correction of reality, is that Porter errs on the side
> of optimism, and that the US is unlikely to leave Iraq in any but a token
> fashion any time soon.  --CGE]
>
>        =====[1]=====
>
>        Inter Press Service News Agency
>        Monday, October 27, 2008   03:55 GMT
>        Final Text of Iraq Pact Reveals a U.S. Debacle
>        Analysis by Gareth Porter*
>
> WASHINGTON, Oct 22 (IPS) - The final draft of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces
> agreement on the U.S. military presence represents an even more crushing
> defeat for the policy of the George W. Bush administration than previously
> thought, the final text reveals.
>
> The final draft, dated Oct. 13, not only imposes unambiguous deadlines for
> withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by 2011 but makes it extremely unlikely
> that a U.S. non-combat presence will be allowed to remain in Iraq for
> training and support purposes beyond the 2011 deadline for withdrawal of all
> U.S. combat forces.
>
> Furthermore, Shiite opposition to the pact as a violation of Iraqi
> sovereignty makes the prospects for passage of even this agreement by the
> Iraqi parliament doubtful. Pro-government Shiite parties, the top Shiite
> clerical body in the country, and a powerful movement led by nationalist
> cleric Moqtada al-Sadr that recently mobilised hundreds of thousands of
> demonstrators in protest against the pact, are all calling for its defeat.
>
> At an Iraqi cabinet meeting Tuesday, ministers raised objections to the
> final draft, and a government spokesman said that the agreement would not
> submit it to the parliament in its current form. But Secretary of Defence
> Robert Gates told three news agencies Tuesday that the door was "pretty far
> closed" on further negotiations.
>
> In the absence of an agreement approved by the Iraqi parliament, U.S. troops
> in Iraq will probably be confined to their bases once the United Nations
> mandate expires Dec. 31.
>
> The clearest sign of the dramatically reduced U.S. negotiating power in the
> final draft is the willingness of the United States to give up
> extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and their employees and
> over U.S. troops in the case of "major and intentional crimes" that occur
> outside bases and while off duty. The United States has never allowed a
> foreign country to have jurisdiction over its troops in any previous status
> of forces agreement.
>
> But even that concession is not enough to satisfy anti-occupation sentiments
> across all Shiite political parties. Sunni politicians hold less decisive
> views on the pact, and Kurds are supportive.
>
> Bush administration policymakers did not imagine when the negotiations began
> formally last March that its bargaining position on the issue of the U.S.
> military presence could have turned out to be so weak in relation with its
> own "client" regime in Baghdad.
>
> They were confident of being able to legitimise a U.S. presence in Iraq for
> decades after the fighting had ended, just as they did in South Korea.
> Secretary of Defence Robert Gates had declared in June 2007 that U.S. troops
> would be in Iraq "for a protracted period of time".
>
> The secret U.S. draft handed to Iraqi officials Mar. 7 put no limit on
> either the number of U.S. troops in Iraq or the duration of their presence
> or their activities. It would have authorised U.S. forces to "conduct
> military operations in Iraq and to detain certain individuals when necessary
> for imperative reasons of security", according to an Apr. 8 article in The
> Guardian quoting from a leaked copy of the draft.
>
> When Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki demanded a timetable for complete U.S.
> withdrawal in early July, the White House insisted that it would not accept
> such a timetable and that any decision on withdrawal "will be conditions
> based". It was even hoping to avoid a requirement for complete withdrawal in
> the agreement, as reflected in false claims to media Jul. 17 that Bush and
> Maliki had agreed on the objective of "further reduction of U.S. combat
> forces from Iraq" rather than complete withdrawal.
>
> By early August, however, Bush had already reduced its negotiating aims. The
> U.S. draft dated Aug. 6, which was translated and posted on the internet by
> Iraqi activist Raed Jarrar, demanded the inclusion of either "targeted
> times" or "time targets" to refer to the dates for withdrawal of U.S. forces
> from all cities, town and villages and for complete combat troop withdrawal
> from Iraq, suggesting that they were not deadlines.
>
> When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Baghdad Aug. 21, the United
> States accepted for the first time a firm date of 2011 for complete
> withdrawal, giving up the demand for ambiguous such terms. However, the Aug.
> 6 draft included a provision that the U.S. could ask Iraq to "extend" the
> date for complete withdrawal of combat troops, based on mutual review of
> "progress" in achieving the withdrawal.
>
> Because it had not yet been removed from the text, U.S. officials continued
> to claim to reporters that the date was "conditions-based", as Karen DeYoung
> reported in the Washington Post Aug. 22.
>
> The administration also continued to hope for approval of a residual force.
> U.S. officials told DeYoung the deal would leave "tens of thousands of U.S.
> troops inside Iraq in supporting roles...for an unspecified time". That hope
> was based on a paragraph of the Aug. 6 draft providing that the Iraqi
> government could request such a force, with the joint committee for
> operations and coordination determining the "tasks and level of the
> troops..."
>
> But the Oct. 13 final draft, a translation of which was posted by Raed
> Jarrar on his website Oct. 20, reveals that the Bush administration has been
> forced to give up its aims of softening the deadline for withdrawal and of a
> residual non-combat force in the country. Unlike the Aug. 6 draft, the final
> text treats any extension of that date as a modification of the agreement,
> which could be done only "in accordance to constitutional procedures in both
> countries".
>
> That is an obvious reference to approval by the Iraqi parliament.
>
> Given the present level of opposition to the agreement within the Shiite
> community, that provision offers scant hope of a residual U.S. non-combat
> force in Iraq after 2011.
>
> Another signal of Iraqi intentions is a provision of the final draft
> limiting the duration of the agreement to three years -- a date coinciding
> with the deadline for complete withdrawal from Iraq. The date can be
> extended only by a decision made by the "constitutional procedures in both
> countries".
>
> The final draft confirms the language of the Aug. 6 draft requiring that all
> U.S. military operations be subject to the approval of the Iraqi government
> and coordinated with Iraqi authorities through a joint U.S.-Iraqi committee.
>
> The negotiating text had already established by Aug. 6 that U.S. troops
> could not detain anyone in the country without a "warrant issued by the
> specialised Iraqi authorities in accordance with Iraqi law" and required
> that the detainees be turned over to Iraqi authorities within 24 hours. The
> Oct. 13 "final draft" goes even further, requiring that any detention by the
> United States, apart from its own personnel, must be "based on an Iraqi
> decision".
>
> The collapse of the Bush administration's ambitious plan for a long-term
> U.S. presence in Iraq highlights the degree of unreality that has prevailed
> among top U.S. officials in both Washington and Baghdad on Iraqi politics.
> They continued to see the Maliki regime as a client which would cooperate
> with U.S. aims even after it was clear that Maliki's agenda was sharply at
> odds with that of the United States.
>
> They also refused to take seriously the opposition to such a presence even
> among the Shiite clerics who had tolerated it in order to obtain Shiite
> control over state power.
>
> *Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in
> U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book,
> "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam",
> was published in 2006.
>
> Copyright (c) 2008 IPS-Inter Press Service. All rights reserved.
>
>        =====[2]=====
>
>        'Sub rosa SOFA brings darkness to Iraq'
>        Sun, 26 Oct 2008 16:13:07 GMT
>
> The controversial US-Iraq security agreement includes 'some secret
> provisions', which would flagrantly violate Iraq's sovereignty.
>
> Secret provisions have been incorporated in the so-called Status of Forces
> Agreement (SOFA), which would violate Iraq's sovereignty in a more direct
> manner than the provisions disclosed by the Iraqi media, the Saudi daily
> Okaz reported on Sunday, citing "informed political sources".
>
> According to the report, although "the secret provisions" would have more
> adverse consequences for Iraq in terms of the country's sovereignty and
> independence, a majority of Iraqi lawmakers have been kept entirely unaware
> of them.
>
> Based on those provisions, the US would be granted the permission to build
> military bases, camps and prisons inside Iraq. The scope of the immunity
> from legal prosecution for the US forces--the most controversial provision
> of SOFA-- would also be extended to include all US security, military and
> civilian firms as well as the US army's contractors.
>
> Under the terms of SOFA, Iraqi officials would be prohibited from meddling
> in operations carried out by US forces or limiting their authority. The US
> would also be allowed to attack any country, which "represents a security
> threat to Iraq" from the country's soil.
>
> After signing the deal, Baghdad would be obliged to ask for Washington's
> approval before concluding any regional or international agreements with
> third countries.
>
> According to the Okaz report, SOFA would bring the Iraqi key ministries of
> defense and interior under US control for 10 years to facilitate "the
> training of the Iraqi forces."
>
> The Saudi newspaper also claimed that under the secret provisions, no
> timetable would be set for the withdrawal of US troops form Iraq and any
> pull-out would depend on several conditions.
>
> The conditions for any US withdrawal include the readiness of Iraqi forces,
> the success in fighting terrorism, the removal of "the neighboring
> countries' security threats", national reconciliation and a consensus among
> all Iraqi political groups on the issue. Washington would be entitled to
> stay in Iraq, if even one of those conditions were not fulfilled.
>
> Based on those SOFA provisions which have made public, the US forces must
> leave the war-torn country by early 2011 without any preconditions.
>
> The report also ruled out the possibility that the US and Iraq would reach
> an agreement before the term of US President George W. Bush in office ends.
>
> The failure to sign the deal, according to the daily, should be considered
> as a setback for the Bush administration which is seeking to play the card
> of SOFA to strengthen the position of the Republican Party before the
> upcoming US presidential elections.
>
> http://www.presstv.ir/Detail.aspx?id=73339&sectionid=351020201
>
>        ###
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-- 
Robert Naiman
Just Foreign Policy
www.justforeignpolicy.org
naiman at justforeignpolicy.org

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