[Peace-discuss] US military "advises" Pakistan

Thu Apr 9 21:55:31 CDT 2009

[For several years following the US invasion of South Vietnam (remember the war 
was primarily with the south) in 1962, US military on the ground were routinely 
referred to as "advisers." --CGE]

	Posted on Thu, Apr. 09, 2009
	Creating closer ties with Pakistani military
	BY TRUDY RUBIN
	trubin at phillynews.com

As President Barack Obama promotes his new plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
there's a little-noticed part of the strategy that draws on psychology more than 
bullets. It involves an effort by Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen, 
CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus and other top U.S. officials to establish 
closer ties with the heads of Pakistan's military and intelligence establishments.

Obama's strategy focuses on Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state, where al Qaeda and 
other jihadis have established havens along the Afghan border. There is much 
skepticism in Washington about whether Pakistan's army or Inter Services 
Intelligence (ISI) agency is willing to take on key jihadi groups that they view 
as a hedge against India.

Mullen is hoping to change that mind-set. He says he believes an essential step 
is rebuilding close ties with Pakistani counterparts. Those ties were breached 
after Congress cut off military cooperation in 1990 and imposed sanctions eight 
years later, because of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Cooperation 
resumed after 9/11; but Washington's history of hot-and-cold attention has left 
a legacy of mistrust.

Mullen has pushed for a comprehensive and long-term approach to Pakistan, in 
which civilian aid and closer military ties are central. ''Pakistan is 
absolutely critical in this region,'' Mullen told me in an interview at the 
Pentagon. ``One of my strategic objectives is to close this gap in the 
relationship with the Pakistani military.''

So Mullen has met repeatedly in recent months with Pakistani army chief Gen. 
Ashfaq Kayani and with the ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha. Petraeus, too, 
has held long discussions with Kayani into the wee hours, and CIA chief Leon 
Panetta just traveled to Islamabad to talk with Pasha. Meantime, Richard 
Holbrooke, Obama's special emissary, is promoting behind-the-scenes efforts to 
ease Pakistani-Indian tensions.

The goal is to develop trust by listening to Pakistani concerns -- and talking 
about U.S. worries. A prime example: whether the Pakistani army -- whose 
doctrine focuses on land war against India -- needs more training in how to 
conduct operations against the militants.

Mullen says he has been ''brutally frank'' with his Pakistani counterparts and 
''they with me, particularly Kayani.'' So far, however, Kayani has been 
reluctant to accept more U.S. trainers in Pakistan. ''Actually, he has been open 
and supportive . . . to more training,'' Mullen says, ``but we have to balance 
the ability to do this with what is acceptable in his own country. There's 
tremendous sensitivity to the U.S. footprint in Pakistan.''

There has been ''a very gradual, relatively small increase'' in trainers for the 
Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that polices the frontier with Afghanistan. 
''They've got new equipment, we're doing training with them that's starting to 
have an effect. So I have confidence this can be done, but I also know we are in 
the early stages,'' Mullen says. More Pakistani officers are coming to the 
United States -- about a hundred mid-grade officers have passed through a 
program at National Defense University.

Another key U.S. concern: Will the ISI cut off its support for militant groups 
like the Afghan Taliban, which it uses to counter Indian influence in 
Afghanistan? Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar operates out of Pakistan's 
Baluchistan region. Or will the ISI end ties with Pakistani terrorists such as 
the group that recently conducted an outrageous attack in Mumbai, India. The ISI 
trained such groups in the past to attack Indian targets in Kashmir.

Mullen says he has ''complete confidence that the military and civilian 
leadership in Pakistan recognize the seriousness of their problem with the 
insurgents.'' He says that Pasha was ''handpicked'' by Kayani to change the ISI, 
and that Kayani has ``put some of his best people in key positions in the ISI.''

But can Kayani and Pasha change the ISI's culture? ''I've led big organizations 
all my life,'' says Mullen, ``and it takes a fairly significant time to change 
an organization.''

The crunch, of course, is that the Pakistani situation is increasingly urgent. 
Terrorist attacks have spread across its major cities, and its army seems unable 
to stop them. U.S. predator attacks may hit some key insurgents, but Pakistani 
leadership is vital to dismantle the networks.

The best outcome would be a reassertion of control by Pakistan's civilian 
governmental institutions over the military and ISI. Pakistani President Asif 
Ali Zardari has taken a strong antiterrorist stance, and he tried to rein in the 
ISI early in his administration. But he was too politically weak to do so; he 
lacks the credibility to rally his public.

The Obama administration should press for speedy approval of a proposed 
five-year aid package for Pakistan to try to strengthen its civilian 
institutions. In the meantime, Mullen's effort to build personal relationships 
is worth trying in an environment with no easy or quick answers. If closer 
military ties fail to produce results, however, congressional pressure will 
mount to put conditions on military aid to Pakistan.

As I left Mullen's office, I asked him, ''Do you think Kayani and Pasha are 
capable of facing up to the insurgents?'' ''Yes, I do,'' he answered firmly. 
Then under his breath, he added, ``Whether or not they do it is another question.''

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