[Peace-discuss] "Believe nothing until it's officially denied"

[Robert Naiman]

Perhaps even more troubling than Obama's speech was last week's NYT  
report in which US officials are now openly accusing elements of the  
Pakistani military not just of "links" but of active collaboration and  
support of terrorist acts inside Pakistan, such as the bombing of the  
Indian Embassy in Kabul. I don't have any reason to doubt that the  
accusation is true. But making it openly may imply momentum for  
certain kinds of action which could be quite explosive.

For example, clearly they want to step up the drone attacks inside  
Pakistan, for which it seems they currently have a "secret"  
understanding with the Pakistani military. From the point of view of  
those taegeting the strikes, if you hit a meeting, that's a jackpot.  
Now suppose they have intelligence that such a meeting includes  
Pakistani military intelligence officials. Is that "back off, too  
hot?" Or is that "double jackpot?" If the latter - which seems likely  
- it's easy to see how there could be a nasty backlash.

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 29, 2009, at 2:17 PM, "C. G. Estabrook" <galliher at illinois.edu>  
wrote:

> I think you're right, and of course I hope you are, but the trouble  
> is that there are people in the Pentagon and the State Department  
> working hard this weekend on the contingency plans for taking  
> effective control of Pakistan. The administration has made it clear  
> in its peculiarly misleading media blitz this week (you pointed out  
> the significance of the Friday announcement) that Pakistan, not  
> Afghanistan, is the real problem. The "stopping terrorism" excuse is  
> a front -- the real task is neutralizing opposition to effective US  
> control of the region.
>
> They're looking at how taking control of an insufficiently active  
> comprador government was done in S. Vietnam, how the US client Zia- 
> ul-Haq arranged for martial law in Pakistan, and how Musharraf did  
> it.  The consequences of such a move were set out by Tariq Ali  
> (author of "The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American  
> Power" [2008]) and Steve Cohen (formerly of UIUC) in a discussion a  
> year ago:
>
>   "Tariq Ali: I think it is a dysfunctional state rather than a  
> failed one, but the notion of jihadi terrorists capturing the  
> nuclear facility is nonsense. They would have to capture the  
> Pakistan army first. This consists of half a million men. The  
> nuclear facility is the most heavily guarded place in the country. A  
> handful of senior officers know the codes. So its safe. And its  
> worth repeating that except for a short period following the break- 
> up of the country in 1971, the command structure of the army has  
> never been broken. Even in 1971, the generals responsible for the  
> debacle were asked politely to resign, which they did. Jihadis could  
> only capture the nuclear facility if the army wanted them to and  
> there is no likelihood of that at the moment.
>
>   "Stephen Cohen: I can provide a gloss on Tariq Ali’s answer -  
> I’ve looked at the question of failure closely in my recent book on  
> Pakistan and concluded that it had failed in pieces, but not compreh 
> ensively, as had Afghanistan (which was in some ways a murdered, not 
>  a failed state) and several African states, which are hardly states 
>  in any sense of the word. Yet, the nuclear assets are perhaps still 
>  vulnerable, one scenario for Pakistan would be a falling out among  
> the military, or perhaps a politician trying to divide the military  
> - in these cases, short of total state failure, nuclear assets could 
>  be important in a power struggle, and who knows what would happen t 
> o them. This is, of course, a distant possibility, and Ali is correc 
> t in emphasising the unity of the armed forces. However, there’s a l 
> ot of concern that under stress unpredictable things could happen, a 
> nd Pakistan’s earlier record as the wholesaler of nuclear technology 
>  to other states does not inspire confidence.
>
>   "Tariq Ali: Cohen is right to say that a split in the army could  
> have catastrophic results, but this is unlikely unless the US  
> decided to invade and occupy the country. That would split the army  
> but it is as long a shot as jihadis capturing the nuclear weapons.  
> True that Pakistan sold nuclear technology in the world market on  
> the assumption that everything was now for sale. They weren’t alone. 
>  Yeltsin’s Russia did the same.
>
>   "Stephen Cohen: The fact that we are even talking about this is  
> comforting to me in a perverse sense: the last sentence of my Idea  
> of Pakistan stated that Pakistan could, soon, become America’s worst 
>  foreign policy nightmare - I’m not pleased to have anticipated this 
>  catastrophe."
>
> http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2008/0213_pakistan_cohen.aspx?rssid=cohens
>
>
> Robert Naiman wrote:
>> I don't think U.S. ground troops fighting in Pakistan in any  
>> numbers in the
>> forseeable future is a likely prospect. There are people in the U.S.
>> government who would very much like to do this, but the Pakistani  
>> government
>> and military have made very clear that this is a red line that they  
>> have no
>> intention of allowing the U.S. to cross.
>> There are many bad things ahead, but this is not likely to be one  
>> of them.
>> Sent from my iPhone
>> On Mar 29, 2009, at 10:52 AM, "C. G. Estabrook" <galliher at illinois.edu 
>> > wrote:
>>> [That maxim is ascribed to a number of experienced journalists,  
>>> from the
>>> late I. F. Stone to Alex Cockburn's father, Claud.  Like the  
>>> psychoanalyst,
>>> the observer of governments should always ask why something is  
>>> denied.
>>> --CGE]
>>> Obama Rules Out US Troops In Pakistan
>>> WASHINGTON (AP) — As he carries out a retooled strategy in Afgha 
>>> nistan,
>>> President Barack Obama says he will consult with Pakistan's  
>>> leaders before
>>> pursuing terrorist hideouts in that country...
>