[Peace-discuss] Bacevich...

[Stuart Levy]

On Wed, Aug 04, 2010 at 11:02:53AM -0500, Robert Naiman wrote:
> Of course it is contributing to the deficit, but it is not the primary
> story, certainly not compared to the economic crisis and the projected
> uncontrolled growth of health care costs. And it is certainly not true that
> war spending is going to cause the country to go bankrupt.
> 
> It's not trillions. It's about a trillion so far. Of course, it is more if
> you count the long term costs of veterans health care, but that is spread
> out over many years. It's a terrible choice to have made, but it's not going
> to "bankrupt the country."
> 
> That the funds could be better spent is another matter entirely. Of course
> they could. But that is not at all the same as saying that we can't afford
> it in an economic sense. In fact, the two claims are opposed to each other.
> If we cannot economically "afford" what we are now spending on the wars,
> then we cannot economically "afford" to spend the same amount of money on
> social needs.


It seems worth pointing out that a war economy is an inefficient
way of implementing a jobs program, too.  Some people (not just G.W.Bush)
say we need the war, and most of a $trillion/year military funding,
to keep the economy healthy.

> 
> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 9:42 AM, Jenifer Cartwright <jencart13 at yahoo.com>wrote:
> 
> > The trillion$ spent on current wars isn't contributing to the US's
> > deficit?? Tying up funds that could be spent on social programs, education,
> > etc??
> >  --Jenifer
> >
> > --- On *Tue, 8/3/10, Robert Naiman <naiman.uiuc at gmail.com>* wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Robert Naiman <naiman.uiuc at gmail.com>
> > Subject: Re: [Peace-discuss] Bacevich...
> > To: "C. G. Estabrook" <galliher at illinois.edu>
> > Cc: "Brussel Morton K." <mkbrussel at comcast.net>, "Peace-discuss List" <
> > peace-discuss at lists.chambana.net>
> > Date: Tuesday, August 3, 2010, 8:47 PM
> >
> > I have to admit, although Michael Lind is obviously a jerk, I enjoyed
> > reading his review, which was well-written.
> >
> > By the way, his critique of Bacevich on the economics is spot on.
> > Unfortunately, in purely economic terms, the US can "afford" this war
> > and many more. War is not the primary cause of the US budget woes, as
> > Lind correctly points out.
> >
> > Nonetheless, obviously, there is a broader point here which is true:
> > from the point of view of the interest of the majority of Americans,
> > and certainly the majority of humanity, the money could obviously be
> > much better spent - including by refunding it to the American people
> > by lowering their taxes. I myself would rather spend it on social
> > needs, but would unite in a second with any Republican to refund it
> > through lower taxes, if it would keep the money away from the
> > Pentagon.
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 3, 2010 at 8:02 PM, C. G. Estabrook <galliher at illinois.edu<http://mc/compose?to=galliher@illinois.edu>>
> > wrote:
> > > Bacevich was certainly a well-out-of-the-closet imperialist when he
> > > published his book "American Empire" in 2002, where he wrote about "the
> > > imperative of America's mission as the vanguard of history, transforming
> > the
> > > global order and, in doing so, perpetuating its own dominance [guided by]
> > > the imperative of military supremacy, maintained in perpetuity and
> > projected
> > > globally" (p.215ff.) That's barely English, but the import is clear.
> > >
> > > What's remarkable - and didn't come thru to me in his rather bland
> > interview
> > > with Democracy Now! (with its one-sentence mention of oil) - is how much
> > > he's quite consciously changed his views in recent years.
> > >
> > > Bacevich now is a vaguer version of Bill Kauffman ("Ain't My America: The
> > > Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American
> > > Anti-Imperialism," 2008). At the heart of his new book is a notion of a
> > > left-right coalition against the war - quite right, but I didn't hear it
> > in
> > > the DN interview.
> > >
> > > That does come thru in a hostile review of Bacevich's new book.  David
> > Green
> > > found this when he was researching Michael Lind, a true imperialist goof,
> > > who therefore liked the old (2002) Bacevich, not the New Model Army man,
> > as
> > > he explains below.
> > >
> > > The critical bromide is that the best analysis comes from an acute
> > critic.
> > >  I don't think Lind's too acute (some do), but he gives a better account
> > of
> > > Bacevich's views here than Bacevich himself seemed to on Democracy Now.
> > And
> > > they are important views, as Bob notes:
> > >
> > >        America Under the Caesars
> > >        Review of "Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path
> > >        to Permanent War" (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010)
> > >        by Andrew J. Bacevich
> > >        Michael Lind, New America Foundation
> > >        June 22, 2010
> > >
> > > IN THE waning years of the Vietnam War, leftist and liberal opponents of
> > the
> > > Cold War discovered that they shared much in common with the critics of
> > > these policies on the libertarian or traditionalist right. The result was
> > a
> > > rebirth of a current of thinking about American foreign policy that is
> > > usually labeled isolationism but which, out of deference to members of
> > this
> > > school who reject such a term as perhaps far too loaded, I shall instead
> > > describe as “anti-interventionism.”
> > >
> > > This is a tradition that has long dominated American politics, and one
> > that
> > > can find its heartland in the small-town America of the Midwest. In fact,
> > > its political eclipse lasted for a very short period of time indeed—from
> > the
> > > selection of Dwight D. Eisenhower over Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft for
> > > president by the Republican Party in 1952 to the Democratic Party’s
> > > nomination in 1972 of George McGovern, with his slogan “Come Home,
> > America.”
> > > Taft and McGovern were both products of the Midwest, which along with
> > much
> > > of New England had been the center of opposition to U.S. participation in
> > > both world wars and the battle with the Soviet Union. The supporters of
> > > these conflicts were disproportionately found in the South and Southwest
> > and
> > > among the Atlanticist financial and commercial elites of the northeastern
> > > cities. During the Cold War, the former diplomat George Kennan and the
> > > scholar William Appleman Williams argued for drastically reducing
> > America’s
> > > military interventions and foreign commitments, as the influential
> > historian
> > > and Indiana native Charles Beard had done in the 1930s and 1940s. Kennan
> > and
> > > Williams, too, were products of the Midwest. Williams was an Iowan;
> > Kennan
> > > hailed from Wisconsin and wrote elegantly about his pioneer roots.
> > Whether
> > > they were on the left or right, all of these thinkers lamented the
> > passing
> > > of pastoral, small-town Middle America and blamed social change in part
> > on
> > > the effects of what they saw as American imperialism.
> > >
> > > According to these men, the United States was once a country with a
> > > public-spirited, frugal citizenry and a limited government that abstained
> > > from aggression abroad. Then, at some point, the Republic was betrayed by
> > > elites who steered the United States on the course to perpetual empire
> > and
> > > war. It is a narrative whose origins lie in a parallel between the United
> > > States and ancient Rome, which lost its republican government and became
> > an
> > > autocratic empire under the Caesars.
> > >
> > > Anti-interventionists do not agree on the exact moment when the American
> > > Republic gave way to the American empire. For some, the transition came
> > with
> > > the rise of the Cold War “national-security state” during the
> > administration
> > > of Harry Truman. For others, it was William McKinley and Theodore
> > > Roosevelt’s “splendid little war” against Spain in 1898.
> > >
> > > Nor is there universal agreement among anti-interventionists as to the
> > > motives of those who turned the Republic into an empire. For Williams, it
> > > was the desire of American mass-production industries to obtain foreign
> > > markets through a global Open Door economic policy. For Beard, it was the
> > > lust for power on the part of politicians like Franklin Roosevelt, whom
> > > Beard detested and accused of knowing about Pearl Harbor in advance (an
> > > accusation only slightly less deranged than the claim of “truthers” that
> > > 9/11 was staged by the U.S. government).
> > >
> > > Yet whatever their differences, members of this school share the hope
> > that a
> > > repudiation of most or all U.S. foreign-policy commitments and a dramatic
> > > reduction in armed forces can make possible a restoration of something
> > like
> > > the idealized, small-town America of the nineteenth- and
> > > early-twentieth-century Midwest.
> > >
> > > IN RECENT years, this venerable American tradition has found its most
> > > eloquent and influential champion in Andrew Bacevich. Now a professor of
> > > international relations and history at Boston University, Bacevich served
> > in
> > > Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, retiring from the army with the rank of
> > > colonel. Although he is a traditionalist conservative, or
> > > “paleoconservative,” Bacevich has found his audience chiefly on the
> > liberal
> > > left, where he has filled the role of Kennan, another conservative and
> > > former insider whose views seemed to validate the Left’s critique of U.S.
> > > foreign policy.
> > >
> > > In a number of books and articles, Bacevich has sought to revive the
> > > anti-interventionist approach. He has written sympathetically about Beard
> > > and wrote an introduction to a reprint of a book by Williams. He has also
> > > authored a series of polemics criticizing contemporary U.S. foreign
> > policy,
> > > including The New American Militarism (Oxford University Press, 2006) and
> > > The Limits of Power (Metropolitan Books, 2008). Washington Rules is the
> > > latest salvo in this campaign.
> > >
> > > Bacevich claims that the foreign policy of both parties is determined by
> > > four “Washington rules.” According to him, “Every president since Harry
> > > Truman has faithfully subscribed to these four assertions and Obama is no
> > > exception.”
> > >
> > > The rules are as follows:
> > >
> > >    "First, the world must be organized (or shaped). . . . Second, only
> > the
> > > United States possesses the capacity to prescribe and enforce such a
> > global
> > > order. . . . Third, America’s writ includes the charge of articulating
> > the
> > > principles that should define the international order. . . . Finally, a
> > few
> > > rogues and recalcitrants aside, everyone understands and accepts this
> > > reality."
> > >
> > > Bacevich declares:
> > >
> > >    "Mainstream Republicans and mainstream Democrats are equally devoted
> > to
> > > this catechism of American statecraft. Little empirical evidence exists
> > to
> > > demonstrate its validity, but no matter: When it comes to matters of
> > faith,
> > > proof is unnecessary."
> > >
> > > The Washington rules have condemned imperial America to perpetual
> > “semiwar.”
> > >
> > > This new offering portrays Bacevich’s increasing alienation from the U.S.
> > > foreign-policy consensus in terms of a narrative of awakening and
> > > repentance: “In measured doses, mortification cleanses the soul. It’s the
> > > perfect antidote for excessive self-regard.” His doubts about U.S.
> > foreign
> > > policy began, he writes, when he visited the former Communist state of
> > East
> > > Germany and discovered it to be run-down and impoverished. He took this,
> > not
> > > as proof that the West’s superior system had prevailed over that of the
> > > Soviets, but as evidence that the Cold War threat had been exaggerated or
> > > nonexistent.
> > >
> > > Like others in the tradition in which he writes, Bacevich views disasters
> > > like Vietnam and Iraq as the all-but-inevitable results of the hubris of
> > > America’s postrepublican empire builders. “George W. Bush’s decision to
> > > launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 pushed [Bacevich] fully into
> > > opposition” to what he saw as a growing American willingness to adopt an
> > > aggressive posture across the world. Bacevich’s son Andrew, an army first
> > > lieutenant, was killed in Iraq.
> > >
> > > IN THE same vein as Bacevich’s other recent books, Washington Rules is a
> > > polemic, not a dissertation, and should be judged by the standards of its
> > > genre. But even as such, Washington Rules will not persuade those who do
> > not
> > > belong to the choir to whom Bacevich is preaching.
> > >
> > > Bacevich recycles many of the references used by other
> > anti-interventionist
> > > authors. Once again, we read that publishing magnate Henry Luce
> > proclaimed
> > > the American Century. Once again, Graham Greene’s 1955 novel The Quiet
> > > American is cited as evidence of the folly of American diplomacy in
> > Vietnam,
> > > or elsewhere.
> > >
> > > Bacevich also parades the familiar anti-interventionist pantheon, ranging
> > > from John Quincy Adams’s opposition to the Mexican-American War, through
> > > Dwight D. Eisenhower with his warning about the “military-industrial
> > > complex,” all the way to Vietnam War critics Martin Luther King Jr.,
> > William
> > > Fulbright and Mike Mansfield. Other than providing quotes that could be
> > > taken out of context and used as proof texts by later generations of
> > > anti-interventionist polemics, these figures have little in common—Adams,
> > > for example, may have opposed the Mexican War, but he favored the
> > American
> > > acquisition of Cuba and the Pacific Northwest, and Fulbright was a
> > > reactionary segregationist, unlike his fellow Vietnam War critic King.
> > > Eisenhower supported the Johnson administration’s escalation of the war
> > in
> > > Vietnam, a point never mentioned by the anti-interventionists who quote
> > him
> > > about the military-industrial complex.
> > >
> > > Like the isolationists of the 1930s and early 1940s who quoted George
> > > Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances” in his Farewell
> > Address,
> > > Bacevich tries to enlist Washington as a patron saint of the
> > > anti-interventionist school:
> > >
> > >    Americans once believed—or at least purported to believe—that
> > citizenship
> > > carried with it a responsibility to contribute to the country’s defense.
> > In
> > > his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” written in the immediate
> > > aftermath of the American Revolution, George Washington offered the
> > classic
> > > formulation of this proposition. “It may be laid down, as a primary
> > > position, and the basis of our system,” the general wrote, “that every
> > > citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a
> > > proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the
> > defense
> > > of it.” Out of this proposal came the tradition of the citizen-soldier,
> > the
> > > warrior who filled the ranks of citizen armies raised for every major war
> > > fought by the United States until that system foundered in Vietnam.
> > >
> > > Turning George Washington, rather than Thomas Jefferson, into the
> > champion
> > > of citizen militias does violence to history. In reality, Washington,
> > like
> > > his wartime aide and later political ally Alexander Hamilton, was so
> > > appalled by the performance of state militias during the War of
> > Independence
> > > that he supported a large and well-equipped standing army. At the
> > > Constitutional Convention, George Washington allegedly inspired Charles
> > > Cotesworth Pinckney to mock a proposal that the constitution limit the
> > > regular army to several thousand men by asking whether invading foreign
> > > armies would agree to the same limitation. And Washington was far from a
> > > Middle American populist. He ruthlessly kicked squatters off the vast
> > > acreage that he owned as a speculator in the future Midwest, and when
> > > frontier farmers rose up against excise taxes in the Whiskey Rebellion,
> > the
> > > wealthy, slave-owning president mounted the saddle and led the U.S. Army
> > to
> > > intimidate them into submission. Indeed, late in life, William Appleman
> > > Williams, one of the predecessors whom Bacevich so admires, came to
> > believe
> > > that the adoption of the Constitution had set the United States on the
> > > course to imperial aggrandizement. Washington was as much a
> > power-mongering
> > > imperialist for Williams as FDR was for Beard.
> > >
> > > BACEVICH’S RHETORICAL technique here resembles that found in similar
> > works
> > > by linguist Noam Chomsky, the late historian Howard Zinn, and their
> > > imitators on the anti-military left and the anti-interventionist right.
> > The
> > > heroes in Bacevich’s narrative include Midwesterners who see through the
> > > pretensions of the conceited East Coast elite. For example, Bacevich
> > writes
> > > the following about former–Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup, who
> > > criticized the Vietnam War:
> > >
> > >    "Like Fulbright, David Shoup was a son of the Middle Border, born and
> > > raised in Indiana and carrying to Washington a wariness of East Coast
> > > elites. . . . In a speech to a gathering of students in Los Angeles on
> > May
> > > 14, 1966, the former marine revealed his own populist inclinations,
> > > targeting what he saw as the bogus rendering of U.S. history that
> > Americans
> > > had been conditioned to accept. In surveying the landscape of the past,
> > > Shoup saw mostly lies."
> > >
> > > One senses a self-portrait in this description.
> > >
> > > When it comes to those with whom he disagrees, the mocking of major
> > figures
> > > in U.S. foreign policy following World War II, whether liberal or
> > > conservative, Democratic or Republican, that goes on in Washington Rules
> > > seems mean-spirited after a while.
> > >
> > > A few examples will have to stand in for many others. CIA Director Allen
> > > Dulles was “the great white case officer.” One imagines Bacevich’s
> > audience
> > > of populists and leftists hissing at his frequent cues: “A cool, urbane,
> > > Princeton-educated patrician. . . . Breeding and education seemingly
> > fitted
> > > Dulles for his sensitive post. If the United States was going to dirty
> > its
> > > hands in the spy business, at least there was a gentleman in charge.” One
> > > American policy maker after another suffers from
> > denigration-by-description.
> > > General David Petraeus:
> > >
> > >    "Petraeus was a gifted officer, identified early in his career as
> > someone
> > > meant for big things. Among his most prominent gifts were those of a
> > > courtier: The young Petraeus displayed a considerable talent for
> > cultivating
> > > influential figures, both in and out of uniform, who might prove useful
> > in
> > > advancing his own prospects. And he was nothing if not smart."
> > >
> > > Now and then Bacevich uses the cartoonist’s art to draw caricatures of
> > U.S.
> > > foreign-policy makers as a group. “Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt,
> > every
> > > U.S. president had insisted that at the far side of America’s resistance
> > to
> > > totalitarianism world peace awaited. The reward for exertions today was
> > to
> > > be a reduced need for exertions on the morrow.” Bacevich expects his
> > > audience to nod in agreement at the folly of Roosevelt and his
> > successors,
> > > but a critical reader might ask: if that was really their belief, weren’t
> > > they correct? After all, the defeat of Nazi Germany allowed the United
> > > States to rapidly demobilize up until the Korean War, and the defeat and
> > > collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Washington and its allies to
> > > dramatically draw down their troop numbers and military spending. Indeed,
> > > Bacevich’s constant editorializing and sarcasm are used to point the
> > reader
> > > to a conclusion that the factual narrative itself does not necessarily
> > > support.
> > >
> > > NOWHERE IS this more true than in Bacevich’s treatment of the Cold War,
> > > which echoes the polemical literature of the anti-interventionist Left
> > > between the 1960s and the 1980s. Those works sought to make U.S. policy
> > > toward Korea, Indochina, Cuba and Latin America appear ludicrous and
> > > irrational, by insisting that these conflicts were not what they in fact
> > > were—proxy wars in great-power struggles—but unprovoked attacks by a
> > > bullying superpower on small countries whose regimes were really
> > independent
> > > of Moscow and Beijing. Much of that writing has been discredited since
> > the
> > > end of the Cold War, by the partial publication of Soviet archives, which
> > > shed light on the workings of other regimes, and the controlled releases
> > of
> > > material by China, North Korea and Vietnam. All tell a far more
> > complicated
> > > story than the simple tale of unprovoked American aggression.
> > >
> > > Scholars are still sorting through the reams of new information, but
> > already
> > > the material has transformed our understanding of the Cold War. For
> > example,
> > > during that struggle many American historians claimed that North Korea’s
> > > invasion of the South caught Stalin and Mao by surprise. We now know that
> > > Stalin and Kim Il Sung arranged the attack and consulted with Mao in
> > > advance. We have learned that Soviet pilots took part in air combat with
> > > their American counterparts in the skies above Korea, while hundreds of
> > > thousands of Chinese troops were stationed in North Vietnam during the
> > > mid-1960s, running the North’s infrastructure, manning antiaircraft
> > defenses
> > > and enabling North Vietnamese regulars to infiltrate South Vietnam.
> > >
> > > One could still make an argument against the Korean and Vietnam wars, as
> > > well as America’s anti-Castro policy. But even a critic of American
> > foreign
> > > policy, in a book on the subject published in 2010, ought to cite some of
> > > the voluminous scholarship about the Cold War from the other side that
> > has
> > > been published since 1989. Instead, there is not a single reference in
> > > Bacevich’s book to this growing body of work.
> > >
> > > THIS DEMONSTRATES one of the fundamental weaknesses of the type of
> > > foreign-policy thinking which Bacevich has embraced and seeks to
> > revitalize.
> > > Its basic article of faith is that since the 1940s or the 1890s (if not
> > the
> > > 1790s), U.S. policy makers have invented nonexistent threats or
> > exaggerated
> > > real threats in order to justify military buildups and military
> > > interventions which, in fact, serve other purposes: opening foreign
> > markets,
> > > winning elections for hawkish politicians, or padding the resumes of
> > > careerist diplomats and soldiers. In order to make that case, however, an
> > > anti-interventionist historian must demonstrate—using evidence from the
> > > other side, not just from the United States—that Washington’s enemies
> > were
> > > never threats at all, except in the imaginations of American policy
> > makers.
> > > Simple assertion is not enough.
> > >
> > > In the great-power struggles of the twentieth century, America was joined
> > by
> > > other great-power allies. Russia, Britain and France fought with the
> > United
> > > States against Germany twice, and when the Cold War ended, Washington was
> > > formally allied with the major European powers and Japan, and informally
> > > with the People’s Republic of China. French President François
> > Mitterrand, a
> > > socialist, flew to Bonn to persuade the West German Bundestag to allow
> > the
> > > installation of U.S. missiles. If leaders in Washington invented or
> > > exaggerated the threats from Germany and the Soviet Union, were leaders
> > in
> > > London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Tokyo and Beijing equally foolish or equally
> > > hypocritical, all at the same time? Were America’s allies colluding with
> > > Washington to pretend that there were threats to their shared interests
> > when
> > > none in fact existed? An older generation of anti-interventionists
> > proposed
> > > a solution to this problem: gullible Americans were tricked into fighting
> > on
> > > behalf of the British Empire in two world wars and the Cold War, with the
> > > help of Anglophiles (and, in some versions, Jews) on the East Coast.
> > > Bacevich does not propound such conspiracy theories, but absent some sort
> > of
> > > international elite collusion, it is difficult to understand why a number
> > of
> > > great powers would engage in hot or cold war together against another
> > great
> > > power or great powers. Unless, of course, the threats were real.
> > >
> > > A DIFFERENT problem weakens Bacevich’s arguments against our most recent
> > > forays into Iraq and Afghanistan. Anti-interventionists always proclaim
> > that
> > > not only are the threats themselves ephemeral but also the military
> > spending
> > > required to fight them will inevitably lead to our downfall. It is one
> > thing
> > > to oppose the Iraq War and the escalation of the Afghan war because they
> > are
> > > unnecessary conflicts that have inflicted needless suffering on the
> > people
> > > of those countries, as well as American soldiers and their families—a
> > view I
> > > share. It is quite another to claim that the United States cannot afford
> > > them. Bacevich argues that America’s perpetual “semiwar” policy is on the
> > > verge of bankrupting the country. According to Bacevich, “Promising
> > > prosperity and peace, the Washington rules are propelling the United
> > States
> > > toward insolvency and perpetual war.” He points to the national debt and
> > > deficits:
> > >
> > >    "A study by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office forecast
> > > trillion-dollar deficits for the next decade. Based on that analysis, by
> > > 2019 the total size of the national debt is likely to surpass $21
> > trillion,
> > > an amount substantially greater than the nation’s GDP."
> > >
> > > But relatively little of that red ink is the result of military spending,
> > > even on two simultaneous wars. The chief short-term cause is the collapse
> > of
> > > government revenues, as a result of the global economic crisis. Long-term
> > > budget shortfalls are caused partly by the Bush tax cuts and partly by
> > the
> > > escalating costs of Medicare, which are driven by industry-wide
> > medical-cost
> > > inflation in the United States. If America were to adopt measures to
> > ensure
> > > that its citizens pay no more for doctors, hospitals or drugs than those
> > in
> > > other industrial democracies, then projected deficits will shrink
> > > dramatically. Certainly, if medical costs are not contained, the U.S.
> > > economy will be wrecked, even if the United States radically downsizes
> > the
> > > military.
> > >
> > > AS A passionate and articulate exponent of the American
> > anti-interventionist
> > > tradition, Bacevich is a worthy successor to Kennan, Williams and Beard.
> > But
> > > that tradition is not convincing, either in its portrayal of American
> > > foreign policy as an avoidable decline from republic to empire, or its
> > > assumption that America’s economic and social problems would be
> > > significantly different if the United States adopted a minimalist defense
> > > strategy. It is not enough to offer an alternative to America’s
> > > foreign-policy orthodoxy. The alternative must be plausible.
> > >
> > > Copyright 2010 The National Interest Online
> > >
> > >
> > http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/america_under_the_caesars_33484
> > >
> > > On 8/3/10 6:46 PM, Brussel Morton K. wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Thanks for sending this on, Bob. Some on this list think Bacevich is a
> > >> stooge, a closet imperialist. Quoting: * * */*Bacevich is an imperialist
> > >> goof.
> > >>
> > >> For his generally benighted view, see his book "American Empire" (2002),
> > >> where he wrote about "the imperative of America's mission as the
> > vanguard
> > >> of
> > >> history, transforming the global order and, in doing so, perpetuating
> > its
> > >> own
> > >> dominance [guided by] the imperative of military supremacy, maintained
> > in
> > >> perpetuity and projected globally" (p.215ff.)
> > >>
> > >> This is the sort of person who ends up as professor of "international
> > >> relations" at Boston University (where Howard Zinn was hounded out).
> > >>
> > >> His objection to American policy in the Mideast on Democracy Now! today
> > is
> > >> that it isn't working. We're not killing enough Asians to make our writ
> > >> run,
> > >> and it's too expensive.
> > >>
> > >> To his credit - because it's so rare - he devotes exactly one sentence
> > to
> > >> the
> > >> real purpose of the war - "We are in that part of the world because of
> > >> oil" -
> > >> but that's all!
> > >>
> > >> The totality of the interview is the sort of objection that Nazi
> > generals
> > >> might have made of the Russian campaign.
> > >>
> > >> The antiwar movement continues to be in serious trouble when people who
> > >> purport to be against the war praise Bacevich. --CGE*/* */ /* *Quite
> > >> remakable. *
> > >>
> > >> What is to be emphasized here are the virulent attacks on those who do
> > not
> > >> precisely say what these guys want them to say (or admit),/ even when
> > they
> > >> are saying things that would get the U.S. government to change its
> > >> behavior.
> > >> /It is all devious, they say. / /It appears as a kind of absolutely
> > rigid
> > >> ideological response not so different from when the Communist party line
> > >> eminating from Lenin and Stalin condemned those like Rosa Luxemberg,
> > >> Mensheviks, Trotskyities, socialists of various stripes, etc. in the
> > early
> > >> part of the 20th century. They would have been happy to see these
> > deviants
> > >> burned at the stake. (Trotsky indeed was assasinated, and others also
> > >> fell.)
> > >>
> > >> --mkb On Aug 3, 2010, at 5:16 PM, Robert Naiman wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Campaigning for President, Senator Obama said: "I don't want to just
> > end
> > >>> the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the
> > first
> > >>> place." But as Andrew Bacevich notes in his new book, "Washington
> > Rules:
> > >>> America's Path to Permanent War," as President, Obama has done the
> > >>> opposite: he has promoted and acted on behalf of the mindset that leads
> > >>> to
> > >>> war. Bacevich's book is a call for Americans to reject the Washington
> > >>> consensus for permanent war, global counterinsurgency and global
> > military
> > >>> power projection, and to demand instead that America "come home," as
> > >>> Martin
> > >>> Luther King called for in 1967, and focus on resolving its own domestic
> > >>> problems rather than act as a self-appointed global police and
> > occupation
> > >>> force. Because of his personal background and establishment
> > credentials,
> > >>> Bacevich may be able to move Americans currently beyond the reach of
> > the
> > >>> peace movement. This is important, because a key task for ending our
> > >>> current wars and preventing future ones is to break the current
> > >>> near-monolithic support for permanent war among the dominant
> > institutions
> > >>> of the Republican Party - a stance that effectively disenfranchises the
> > >>> substantial minority of Republican voters who oppose the permanent war.
> > >>>
> > >>> This is why Bacevich's new book is potentially important for the U.S.
> > >>> peace
> > >>> movement. Get the book, read it, give it to a Republican friend, and
> > talk
> > >>> to them about it. Join Just Foreign Policy on September 24th for a
> > >>> "Virtual
> > >>> Brown Bag" with Andrew Bacevich, and try to virtually bring your
> > >>> Republican
> > >>> friend.
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Robert Naiman
> > Policy Director
> > Just Foreign Policy
> > www.justforeignpolicy.org
> > naiman at justforeignpolicy.org<http://mc/compose?to=naiman@justforeignpolicy.org>
> >
> > Urge Congress to Support a Timetable for Military Withdrawal from
> > Afghanistan
> > http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern
> > _______________________________________________
> > Peace-discuss mailing list
> > Peace-discuss at lists.chambana.net<http://mc/compose?to=Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net>
> > http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss
> >
> >
> >
> 
> 
> -- 
> Robert Naiman
> Policy Director
> Just Foreign Policy
> www.justforeignpolicy.org
> naiman at justforeignpolicy.org
> 
> Urge Congress to Support a Timetable for Military Withdrawal from
> Afghanistan
> http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern

> _______________________________________________
> Peace-discuss mailing list
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