[Peace-discuss] Bacevich...

[E.Wayne Johnson]

Some, like Kucinich, strike at the root.

"The only thing Americans make is war."

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Stuart Levy" <slevy at ncsa.uiuc.edu>
To: "Robert Naiman" <naiman.uiuc at gmail.com>
Cc: "Peace-discuss List" <peace-discuss at lists.chambana.net>
Sent: Thursday, August 05, 2010 12:12 AM
Subject: Re: [Peace-discuss] Bacevich...


> On Wed, Aug 04, 2010 at 11:02:53AM -0500, Robert Naiman wrote:
>> Of course it is contributing to the deficit, but it is not the primary
>> story, certainly not compared to the economic crisis and the projected
>> uncontrolled growth of health care costs. And it is certainly not true 
>> that
>> war spending is going to cause the country to go bankrupt.
>>
>> It's not trillions. It's about a trillion so far. Of course, it is more 
>> if
>> you count the long term costs of veterans health care, but that is spread
>> out over many years. It's a terrible choice to have made, but it's not 
>> going
>> to "bankrupt the country."
>>
>> That the funds could be better spent is another matter entirely. Of 
>> course
>> they could. But that is not at all the same as saying that we can't 
>> afford
>> it in an economic sense. In fact, the two claims are opposed to each 
>> other.
>> If we cannot economically "afford" what we are now spending on the wars,
>> then we cannot economically "afford" to spend the same amount of money on
>> social needs.
>
>
> It seems worth pointing out that a war economy is an inefficient
> way of implementing a jobs program, too.  Some people (not just G.W.Bush)
> say we need the war, and most of a $trillion/year military funding,
> to keep the economy healthy.
>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 9:42 AM, Jenifer Cartwright 
>> <jencart13 at yahoo.com>wrote:
>>
>> > The trillion$ spent on current wars isn't contributing to the US's
>> > deficit?? Tying up funds that could be spent on social programs, 
>> > education,
>> > etc??
>> >  --Jenifer
>> >
>> > --- On *Tue, 8/3/10, Robert Naiman <naiman.uiuc at gmail.com>* wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > From: Robert Naiman <naiman.uiuc at gmail.com>
>> > Subject: Re: [Peace-discuss] Bacevich...
>> > To: "C. G. Estabrook" <galliher at illinois.edu>
>> > Cc: "Brussel Morton K." <mkbrussel at comcast.net>, "Peace-discuss List" <
>> > peace-discuss at lists.chambana.net>
>> > Date: Tuesday, August 3, 2010, 8:47 PM
>> >
>> > I have to admit, although Michael Lind is obviously a jerk, I enjoyed
>> > reading his review, which was well-written.
>> >
>> > By the way, his critique of Bacevich on the economics is spot on.
>> > Unfortunately, in purely economic terms, the US can "afford" this war
>> > and many more. War is not the primary cause of the US budget woes, as
>> > Lind correctly points out.
>> >
>> > Nonetheless, obviously, there is a broader point here which is true:
>> > from the point of view of the interest of the majority of Americans,
>> > and certainly the majority of humanity, the money could obviously be
>> > much better spent - including by refunding it to the American people
>> > by lowering their taxes. I myself would rather spend it on social
>> > needs, but would unite in a second with any Republican to refund it
>> > through lower taxes, if it would keep the money away from the
>> > Pentagon.
>> >
>> > On Tue, Aug 3, 2010 at 8:02 PM, C. G. Estabrook 
>> > <galliher at illinois.edu<http://mc/compose?to=galliher@illinois.edu>>
>> > wrote:
>> > > Bacevich was certainly a well-out-of-the-closet imperialist when he
>> > > published his book "American Empire" in 2002, where he wrote about 
>> > > "the
>> > > imperative of America's mission as the vanguard of history, 
>> > > transforming
>> > the
>> > > global order and, in doing so, perpetuating its own dominance [guided 
>> > > by]
>> > > the imperative of military supremacy, maintained in perpetuity and
>> > projected
>> > > globally" (p.215ff.) That's barely English, but the import is clear.
>> > >
>> > > What's remarkable - and didn't come thru to me in his rather bland
>> > interview
>> > > with Democracy Now! (with its one-sentence mention of oil) - is how 
>> > > much
>> > > he's quite consciously changed his views in recent years.
>> > >
>> > > Bacevich now is a vaguer version of Bill Kauffman ("Ain't My America: 
>> > > The
>> > > Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American
>> > > Anti-Imperialism," 2008). At the heart of his new book is a notion of 
>> > > a
>> > > left-right coalition against the war - quite right, but I didn't hear 
>> > > it
>> > in
>> > > the DN interview.
>> > >
>> > > That does come thru in a hostile review of Bacevich's new book. 
>> > > David
>> > Green
>> > > found this when he was researching Michael Lind, a true imperialist 
>> > > goof,
>> > > who therefore liked the old (2002) Bacevich, not the New Model Army 
>> > > man,
>> > as
>> > > he explains below.
>> > >
>> > > The critical bromide is that the best analysis comes from an acute
>> > critic.
>> > >  I don't think Lind's too acute (some do), but he gives a better 
>> > > account
>> > of
>> > > Bacevich's views here than Bacevich himself seemed to on Democracy 
>> > > Now.
>> > And
>> > > they are important views, as Bob notes:
>> > >
>> > >        America Under the Caesars
>> > >        Review of "Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s 
>> > > Path
>> > >        to Permanent War" (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010)
>> > >        by Andrew J. Bacevich
>> > >        Michael Lind, New America Foundation
>> > >        June 22, 2010
>> > >
>> > > IN THE waning years of the Vietnam War, leftist and liberal opponents 
>> > > of
>> > the
>> > > Cold War discovered that they shared much in common with the critics 
>> > > of
>> > > these policies on the libertarian or traditionalist right. The result 
>> > > was
>> > a
>> > > rebirth of a current of thinking about American foreign policy that 
>> > > is
>> > > usually labeled isolationism but which, out of deference to members 
>> > > of
>> > this
>> > > school who reject such a term as perhaps far too loaded, I shall 
>> > > instead
>> > > describe as “anti-interventionism.”
>> > >
>> > > This is a tradition that has long dominated American politics, and 
>> > > one
>> > that
>> > > can find its heartland in the small-town America of the Midwest. In 
>> > > fact,
>> > > its political eclipse lasted for a very short period of time 
>> > > indeed—from
>> > the
>> > > selection of Dwight D. Eisenhower over Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft 
>> > > for
>> > > president by the Republican Party in 1952 to the Democratic Party’s
>> > > nomination in 1972 of George McGovern, with his slogan “Come Home,
>> > America.”
>> > > Taft and McGovern were both products of the Midwest, which along with
>> > much
>> > > of New England had been the center of opposition to U.S. 
>> > > participation in
>> > > both world wars and the battle with the Soviet Union. The supporters 
>> > > of
>> > > these conflicts were disproportionately found in the South and 
>> > > Southwest
>> > and
>> > > among the Atlanticist financial and commercial elites of the 
>> > > northeastern
>> > > cities. During the Cold War, the former diplomat George Kennan and 
>> > > the
>> > > scholar William Appleman Williams argued for drastically reducing
>> > America’s
>> > > military interventions and foreign commitments, as the influential
>> > historian
>> > > and Indiana native Charles Beard had done in the 1930s and 1940s. 
>> > > Kennan
>> > and
>> > > Williams, too, were products of the Midwest. Williams was an Iowan;
>> > Kennan
>> > > hailed from Wisconsin and wrote elegantly about his pioneer roots.
>> > Whether
>> > > they were on the left or right, all of these thinkers lamented the
>> > passing
>> > > of pastoral, small-town Middle America and blamed social change in 
>> > > part
>> > on
>> > > the effects of what they saw as American imperialism.
>> > >
>> > > According to these men, the United States was once a country with a
>> > > public-spirited, frugal citizenry and a limited government that 
>> > > abstained
>> > > from aggression abroad. Then, at some point, the Republic was 
>> > > betrayed by
>> > > elites who steered the United States on the course to perpetual 
>> > > empire
>> > and
>> > > war. It is a narrative whose origins lie in a parallel between the 
>> > > United
>> > > States and ancient Rome, which lost its republican government and 
>> > > became
>> > an
>> > > autocratic empire under the Caesars.
>> > >
>> > > Anti-interventionists do not agree on the exact moment when the 
>> > > American
>> > > Republic gave way to the American empire. For some, the transition 
>> > > came
>> > with
>> > > the rise of the Cold War “national-security state” during the
>> > administration
>> > > of Harry Truman. For others, it was William McKinley and Theodore
>> > > Roosevelt’s “splendid little war” against Spain in 1898.
>> > >
>> > > Nor is there universal agreement among anti-interventionists as to 
>> > > the
>> > > motives of those who turned the Republic into an empire. For 
>> > > Williams, it
>> > > was the desire of American mass-production industries to obtain 
>> > > foreign
>> > > markets through a global Open Door economic policy. For Beard, it was 
>> > > the
>> > > lust for power on the part of politicians like Franklin Roosevelt, 
>> > > whom
>> > > Beard detested and accused of knowing about Pearl Harbor in advance 
>> > > (an
>> > > accusation only slightly less deranged than the claim of “truthers” 
>> > > that
>> > > 9/11 was staged by the U.S. government).
>> > >
>> > > Yet whatever their differences, members of this school share the hope
>> > that a
>> > > repudiation of most or all U.S. foreign-policy commitments and a 
>> > > dramatic
>> > > reduction in armed forces can make possible a restoration of 
>> > > something
>> > like
>> > > the idealized, small-town America of the nineteenth- and
>> > > early-twentieth-century Midwest.
>> > >
>> > > IN RECENT years, this venerable American tradition has found its most
>> > > eloquent and influential champion in Andrew Bacevich. Now a professor 
>> > > of
>> > > international relations and history at Boston University, Bacevich 
>> > > served
>> > in
>> > > Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, retiring from the army with the rank of
>> > > colonel. Although he is a traditionalist conservative, or
>> > > “paleoconservative,” Bacevich has found his audience chiefly on the
>> > liberal
>> > > left, where he has filled the role of Kennan, another conservative 
>> > > and
>> > > former insider whose views seemed to validate the Left’s critique of 
>> > > U.S.
>> > > foreign policy.
>> > >
>> > > In a number of books and articles, Bacevich has sought to revive the
>> > > anti-interventionist approach. He has written sympathetically about 
>> > > Beard
>> > > and wrote an introduction to a reprint of a book by Williams. He has 
>> > > also
>> > > authored a series of polemics criticizing contemporary U.S. foreign
>> > policy,
>> > > including The New American Militarism (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
>> > > and
>> > > The Limits of Power (Metropolitan Books, 2008). Washington Rules is 
>> > > the
>> > > latest salvo in this campaign.
>> > >
>> > > Bacevich claims that the foreign policy of both parties is determined 
>> > > by
>> > > four “Washington rules.” According to him, “Every president since 
>> > > Harry
>> > > Truman has faithfully subscribed to these four assertions and Obama 
>> > > is no
>> > > exception.”
>> > >
>> > > The rules are as follows:
>> > >
>> > >    "First, the world must be organized (or shaped). . . . Second, 
>> > > only
>> > the
>> > > United States possesses the capacity to prescribe and enforce such a
>> > global
>> > > order. . . . Third, America’s writ includes the charge of 
>> > > articulating
>> > the
>> > > principles that should define the international order. . . . Finally, 
>> > > a
>> > few
>> > > rogues and recalcitrants aside, everyone understands and accepts this
>> > > reality."
>> > >
>> > > Bacevich declares:
>> > >
>> > >    "Mainstream Republicans and mainstream Democrats are equally 
>> > > devoted
>> > to
>> > > this catechism of American statecraft. Little empirical evidence 
>> > > exists
>> > to
>> > > demonstrate its validity, but no matter: When it comes to matters of
>> > faith,
>> > > proof is unnecessary."
>> > >
>> > > The Washington rules have condemned imperial America to perpetual
>> > “semiwar.”
>> > >
>> > > This new offering portrays Bacevich’s increasing alienation from the 
>> > > U.S.
>> > > foreign-policy consensus in terms of a narrative of awakening and
>> > > repentance: “In measured doses, mortification cleanses the soul. It’s 
>> > > the
>> > > perfect antidote for excessive self-regard.” His doubts about U.S.
>> > foreign
>> > > policy began, he writes, when he visited the former Communist state 
>> > > of
>> > East
>> > > Germany and discovered it to be run-down and impoverished. He took 
>> > > this,
>> > not
>> > > as proof that the West’s superior system had prevailed over that of 
>> > > the
>> > > Soviets, but as evidence that the Cold War threat had been 
>> > > exaggerated or
>> > > nonexistent.
>> > >
>> > > Like others in the tradition in which he writes, Bacevich views 
>> > > disasters
>> > > like Vietnam and Iraq as the all-but-inevitable results of the hubris 
>> > > of
>> > > America’s postrepublican empire builders. “George W. Bush’s decision 
>> > > to
>> > > launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 pushed [Bacevich] fully into
>> > > opposition” to what he saw as a growing American willingness to adopt 
>> > > an
>> > > aggressive posture across the world. Bacevich’s son Andrew, an army 
>> > > first
>> > > lieutenant, was killed in Iraq.
>> > >
>> > > IN THE same vein as Bacevich’s other recent books, Washington Rules 
>> > > is a
>> > > polemic, not a dissertation, and should be judged by the standards of 
>> > > its
>> > > genre. But even as such, Washington Rules will not persuade those who 
>> > > do
>> > not
>> > > belong to the choir to whom Bacevich is preaching.
>> > >
>> > > Bacevich recycles many of the references used by other
>> > anti-interventionist
>> > > authors. Once again, we read that publishing magnate Henry Luce
>> > proclaimed
>> > > the American Century. Once again, Graham Greene’s 1955 novel The 
>> > > Quiet
>> > > American is cited as evidence of the folly of American diplomacy in
>> > Vietnam,
>> > > or elsewhere.
>> > >
>> > > Bacevich also parades the familiar anti-interventionist pantheon, 
>> > > ranging
>> > > from John Quincy Adams’s opposition to the Mexican-American War, 
>> > > through
>> > > Dwight D. Eisenhower with his warning about the “military-industrial
>> > > complex,” all the way to Vietnam War critics Martin Luther King Jr.,
>> > William
>> > > Fulbright and Mike Mansfield. Other than providing quotes that could 
>> > > be
>> > > taken out of context and used as proof texts by later generations of
>> > > anti-interventionist polemics, these figures have little in 
>> > > common—Adams,
>> > > for example, may have opposed the Mexican War, but he favored the
>> > American
>> > > acquisition of Cuba and the Pacific Northwest, and Fulbright was a
>> > > reactionary segregationist, unlike his fellow Vietnam War critic 
>> > > King.
>> > > Eisenhower supported the Johnson administration’s escalation of the 
>> > > war
>> > in
>> > > Vietnam, a point never mentioned by the anti-interventionists who 
>> > > quote
>> > him
>> > > about the military-industrial complex.
>> > >
>> > > Like the isolationists of the 1930s and early 1940s who quoted George
>> > > Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances” in his Farewell
>> > Address,
>> > > Bacevich tries to enlist Washington as a patron saint of the
>> > > anti-interventionist school:
>> > >
>> > >    Americans once believed—or at least purported to believe—that
>> > citizenship
>> > > carried with it a responsibility to contribute to the country’s 
>> > > defense.
>> > In
>> > > his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” written in the immediate
>> > > aftermath of the American Revolution, George Washington offered the
>> > classic
>> > > formulation of this proposition. “It may be laid down, as a primary
>> > > position, and the basis of our system,” the general wrote, “that 
>> > > every
>> > > citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only 
>> > > a
>> > > proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the
>> > defense
>> > > of it.” Out of this proposal came the tradition of the 
>> > > citizen-soldier,
>> > the
>> > > warrior who filled the ranks of citizen armies raised for every major 
>> > > war
>> > > fought by the United States until that system foundered in Vietnam.
>> > >
>> > > Turning George Washington, rather than Thomas Jefferson, into the
>> > champion
>> > > of citizen militias does violence to history. In reality, Washington,
>> > like
>> > > his wartime aide and later political ally Alexander Hamilton, was so
>> > > appalled by the performance of state militias during the War of
>> > Independence
>> > > that he supported a large and well-equipped standing army. At the
>> > > Constitutional Convention, George Washington allegedly inspired 
>> > > Charles
>> > > Cotesworth Pinckney to mock a proposal that the constitution limit 
>> > > the
>> > > regular army to several thousand men by asking whether invading 
>> > > foreign
>> > > armies would agree to the same limitation. And Washington was far 
>> > > from a
>> > > Middle American populist. He ruthlessly kicked squatters off the vast
>> > > acreage that he owned as a speculator in the future Midwest, and when
>> > > frontier farmers rose up against excise taxes in the Whiskey 
>> > > Rebellion,
>> > the
>> > > wealthy, slave-owning president mounted the saddle and led the U.S. 
>> > > Army
>> > to
>> > > intimidate them into submission. Indeed, late in life, William 
>> > > Appleman
>> > > Williams, one of the predecessors whom Bacevich so admires, came to
>> > believe
>> > > that the adoption of the Constitution had set the United States on 
>> > > the
>> > > course to imperial aggrandizement. Washington was as much a
>> > power-mongering
>> > > imperialist for Williams as FDR was for Beard.
>> > >
>> > > BACEVICH’S RHETORICAL technique here resembles that found in similar
>> > works
>> > > by linguist Noam Chomsky, the late historian Howard Zinn, and their
>> > > imitators on the anti-military left and the anti-interventionist 
>> > > right.
>> > The
>> > > heroes in Bacevich’s narrative include Midwesterners who see through 
>> > > the
>> > > pretensions of the conceited East Coast elite. For example, Bacevich
>> > writes
>> > > the following about former–Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup, who
>> > > criticized the Vietnam War:
>> > >
>> > >    "Like Fulbright, David Shoup was a son of the Middle Border, born 
>> > > and
>> > > raised in Indiana and carrying to Washington a wariness of East Coast
>> > > elites. . . . In a speech to a gathering of students in Los Angeles 
>> > > on
>> > May
>> > > 14, 1966, the former marine revealed his own populist inclinations,
>> > > targeting what he saw as the bogus rendering of U.S. history that
>> > Americans
>> > > had been conditioned to accept. In surveying the landscape of the 
>> > > past,
>> > > Shoup saw mostly lies."
>> > >
>> > > One senses a self-portrait in this description.
>> > >
>> > > When it comes to those with whom he disagrees, the mocking of major
>> > figures
>> > > in U.S. foreign policy following World War II, whether liberal or
>> > > conservative, Democratic or Republican, that goes on in Washington 
>> > > Rules
>> > > seems mean-spirited after a while.
>> > >
>> > > A few examples will have to stand in for many others. CIA Director 
>> > > Allen
>> > > Dulles was “the great white case officer.” One imagines Bacevich’s
>> > audience
>> > > of populists and leftists hissing at his frequent cues: “A cool, 
>> > > urbane,
>> > > Princeton-educated patrician. . . . Breeding and education seemingly
>> > fitted
>> > > Dulles for his sensitive post. If the United States was going to 
>> > > dirty
>> > its
>> > > hands in the spy business, at least there was a gentleman in charge.” 
>> > > One
>> > > American policy maker after another suffers from
>> > denigration-by-description.
>> > > General David Petraeus:
>> > >
>> > >    "Petraeus was a gifted officer, identified early in his career as
>> > someone
>> > > meant for big things. Among his most prominent gifts were those of a
>> > > courtier: The young Petraeus displayed a considerable talent for
>> > cultivating
>> > > influential figures, both in and out of uniform, who might prove 
>> > > useful
>> > in
>> > > advancing his own prospects. And he was nothing if not smart."
>> > >
>> > > Now and then Bacevich uses the cartoonist’s art to draw caricatures 
>> > > of
>> > U.S.
>> > > foreign-policy makers as a group. “Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt,
>> > every
>> > > U.S. president had insisted that at the far side of America’s 
>> > > resistance
>> > to
>> > > totalitarianism world peace awaited. The reward for exertions today 
>> > > was
>> > to
>> > > be a reduced need for exertions on the morrow.” Bacevich expects his
>> > > audience to nod in agreement at the folly of Roosevelt and his
>> > successors,
>> > > but a critical reader might ask: if that was really their belief, 
>> > > weren’t
>> > > they correct? After all, the defeat of Nazi Germany allowed the 
>> > > United
>> > > States to rapidly demobilize up until the Korean War, and the defeat 
>> > > and
>> > > collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Washington and its allies to
>> > > dramatically draw down their troop numbers and military spending. 
>> > > Indeed,
>> > > Bacevich’s constant editorializing and sarcasm are used to point the
>> > reader
>> > > to a conclusion that the factual narrative itself does not 
>> > > necessarily
>> > > support.
>> > >
>> > > NOWHERE IS this more true than in Bacevich’s treatment of the Cold 
>> > > War,
>> > > which echoes the polemical literature of the anti-interventionist 
>> > > Left
>> > > between the 1960s and the 1980s. Those works sought to make U.S. 
>> > > policy
>> > > toward Korea, Indochina, Cuba and Latin America appear ludicrous and
>> > > irrational, by insisting that these conflicts were not what they in 
>> > > fact
>> > > were—proxy wars in great-power struggles—but unprovoked attacks by a
>> > > bullying superpower on small countries whose regimes were really
>> > independent
>> > > of Moscow and Beijing. Much of that writing has been discredited 
>> > > since
>> > the
>> > > end of the Cold War, by the partial publication of Soviet archives, 
>> > > which
>> > > shed light on the workings of other regimes, and the controlled 
>> > > releases
>> > of
>> > > material by China, North Korea and Vietnam. All tell a far more
>> > complicated
>> > > story than the simple tale of unprovoked American aggression.
>> > >
>> > > Scholars are still sorting through the reams of new information, but
>> > already
>> > > the material has transformed our understanding of the Cold War. For
>> > example,
>> > > during that struggle many American historians claimed that North 
>> > > Korea’s
>> > > invasion of the South caught Stalin and Mao by surprise. We now know 
>> > > that
>> > > Stalin and Kim Il Sung arranged the attack and consulted with Mao in
>> > > advance. We have learned that Soviet pilots took part in air combat 
>> > > with
>> > > their American counterparts in the skies above Korea, while hundreds 
>> > > of
>> > > thousands of Chinese troops were stationed in North Vietnam during 
>> > > the
>> > > mid-1960s, running the North’s infrastructure, manning antiaircraft
>> > defenses
>> > > and enabling North Vietnamese regulars to infiltrate South Vietnam.
>> > >
>> > > One could still make an argument against the Korean and Vietnam wars, 
>> > > as
>> > > well as America’s anti-Castro policy. But even a critic of American
>> > foreign
>> > > policy, in a book on the subject published in 2010, ought to cite 
>> > > some of
>> > > the voluminous scholarship about the Cold War from the other side 
>> > > that
>> > has
>> > > been published since 1989. Instead, there is not a single reference 
>> > > in
>> > > Bacevich’s book to this growing body of work.
>> > >
>> > > THIS DEMONSTRATES one of the fundamental weaknesses of the type of
>> > > foreign-policy thinking which Bacevich has embraced and seeks to
>> > revitalize.
>> > > Its basic article of faith is that since the 1940s or the 1890s (if 
>> > > not
>> > the
>> > > 1790s), U.S. policy makers have invented nonexistent threats or
>> > exaggerated
>> > > real threats in order to justify military buildups and military
>> > > interventions which, in fact, serve other purposes: opening foreign
>> > markets,
>> > > winning elections for hawkish politicians, or padding the resumes of
>> > > careerist diplomats and soldiers. In order to make that case, 
>> > > however, an
>> > > anti-interventionist historian must demonstrate—using evidence from 
>> > > the
>> > > other side, not just from the United States—that Washington’s enemies
>> > were
>> > > never threats at all, except in the imaginations of American policy
>> > makers.
>> > > Simple assertion is not enough.
>> > >
>> > > In the great-power struggles of the twentieth century, America was 
>> > > joined
>> > by
>> > > other great-power allies. Russia, Britain and France fought with the
>> > United
>> > > States against Germany twice, and when the Cold War ended, Washington 
>> > > was
>> > > formally allied with the major European powers and Japan, and 
>> > > informally
>> > > with the People’s Republic of China. French President François
>> > Mitterrand, a
>> > > socialist, flew to Bonn to persuade the West German Bundestag to 
>> > > allow
>> > the
>> > > installation of U.S. missiles. If leaders in Washington invented or
>> > > exaggerated the threats from Germany and the Soviet Union, were 
>> > > leaders
>> > in
>> > > London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Tokyo and Beijing equally foolish or 
>> > > equally
>> > > hypocritical, all at the same time? Were America’s allies colluding 
>> > > with
>> > > Washington to pretend that there were threats to their shared 
>> > > interests
>> > when
>> > > none in fact existed? An older generation of anti-interventionists
>> > proposed
>> > > a solution to this problem: gullible Americans were tricked into 
>> > > fighting
>> > on
>> > > behalf of the British Empire in two world wars and the Cold War, with 
>> > > the
>> > > help of Anglophiles (and, in some versions, Jews) on the East Coast.
>> > > Bacevich does not propound such conspiracy theories, but absent some 
>> > > sort
>> > of
>> > > international elite collusion, it is difficult to understand why a 
>> > > number
>> > of
>> > > great powers would engage in hot or cold war together against another
>> > great
>> > > power or great powers. Unless, of course, the threats were real.
>> > >
>> > > A DIFFERENT problem weakens Bacevich’s arguments against our most 
>> > > recent
>> > > forays into Iraq and Afghanistan. Anti-interventionists always 
>> > > proclaim
>> > that
>> > > not only are the threats themselves ephemeral but also the military
>> > spending
>> > > required to fight them will inevitably lead to our downfall. It is 
>> > > one
>> > thing
>> > > to oppose the Iraq War and the escalation of the Afghan war because 
>> > > they
>> > are
>> > > unnecessary conflicts that have inflicted needless suffering on the
>> > people
>> > > of those countries, as well as American soldiers and their families—a
>> > view I
>> > > share. It is quite another to claim that the United States cannot 
>> > > afford
>> > > them. Bacevich argues that America’s perpetual “semiwar” policy is on 
>> > > the
>> > > verge of bankrupting the country. According to Bacevich, “Promising
>> > > prosperity and peace, the Washington rules are propelling the United
>> > States
>> > > toward insolvency and perpetual war.” He points to the national debt 
>> > > and
>> > > deficits:
>> > >
>> > >    "A study by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office forecast
>> > > trillion-dollar deficits for the next decade. Based on that analysis, 
>> > > by
>> > > 2019 the total size of the national debt is likely to surpass $21
>> > trillion,
>> > > an amount substantially greater than the nation’s GDP."
>> > >
>> > > But relatively little of that red ink is the result of military 
>> > > spending,
>> > > even on two simultaneous wars. The chief short-term cause is the 
>> > > collapse
>> > of
>> > > government revenues, as a result of the global economic crisis. 
>> > > Long-term
>> > > budget shortfalls are caused partly by the Bush tax cuts and partly 
>> > > by
>> > the
>> > > escalating costs of Medicare, which are driven by industry-wide
>> > medical-cost
>> > > inflation in the United States. If America were to adopt measures to
>> > ensure
>> > > that its citizens pay no more for doctors, hospitals or drugs than 
>> > > those
>> > in
>> > > other industrial democracies, then projected deficits will shrink
>> > > dramatically. Certainly, if medical costs are not contained, the U.S.
>> > > economy will be wrecked, even if the United States radically 
>> > > downsizes
>> > the
>> > > military.
>> > >
>> > > AS A passionate and articulate exponent of the American
>> > anti-interventionist
>> > > tradition, Bacevich is a worthy successor to Kennan, Williams and 
>> > > Beard.
>> > But
>> > > that tradition is not convincing, either in its portrayal of American
>> > > foreign policy as an avoidable decline from republic to empire, or 
>> > > its
>> > > assumption that America’s economic and social problems would be
>> > > significantly different if the United States adopted a minimalist 
>> > > defense
>> > > strategy. It is not enough to offer an alternative to America’s
>> > > foreign-policy orthodoxy. The alternative must be plausible.
>> > >
>> > > Copyright 2010 The National Interest Online
>> > >
>> > >
>> > http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/america_under_the_caesars_33484
>> > >
>> > > On 8/3/10 6:46 PM, Brussel Morton K. wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> Thanks for sending this on, Bob. Some on this list think Bacevich is 
>> > >> a
>> > >> stooge, a closet imperialist. Quoting: * * */*Bacevich is an 
>> > >> imperialist
>> > >> goof.
>> > >>
>> > >> For his generally benighted view, see his book "American Empire" 
>> > >> (2002),
>> > >> where he wrote about "the imperative of America's mission as the
>> > vanguard
>> > >> of
>> > >> history, transforming the global order and, in doing so, 
>> > >> perpetuating
>> > its
>> > >> own
>> > >> dominance [guided by] the imperative of military supremacy, 
>> > >> maintained
>> > in
>> > >> perpetuity and projected globally" (p.215ff.)
>> > >>
>> > >> This is the sort of person who ends up as professor of 
>> > >> "international
>> > >> relations" at Boston University (where Howard Zinn was hounded out).
>> > >>
>> > >> His objection to American policy in the Mideast on Democracy Now! 
>> > >> today
>> > is
>> > >> that it isn't working. We're not killing enough Asians to make our 
>> > >> writ
>> > >> run,
>> > >> and it's too expensive.
>> > >>
>> > >> To his credit - because it's so rare - he devotes exactly one 
>> > >> sentence
>> > to
>> > >> the
>> > >> real purpose of the war - "We are in that part of the world because 
>> > >> of
>> > >> oil" -
>> > >> but that's all!
>> > >>
>> > >> The totality of the interview is the sort of objection that Nazi
>> > generals
>> > >> might have made of the Russian campaign.
>> > >>
>> > >> The antiwar movement continues to be in serious trouble when people 
>> > >> who
>> > >> purport to be against the war praise Bacevich. --CGE*/* */ /* *Quite
>> > >> remakable. *
>> > >>
>> > >> What is to be emphasized here are the virulent attacks on those who 
>> > >> do
>> > not
>> > >> precisely say what these guys want them to say (or admit),/ even 
>> > >> when
>> > they
>> > >> are saying things that would get the U.S. government to change its
>> > >> behavior.
>> > >> /It is all devious, they say. / /It appears as a kind of absolutely
>> > rigid
>> > >> ideological response not so different from when the Communist party 
>> > >> line
>> > >> eminating from Lenin and Stalin condemned those like Rosa Luxemberg,
>> > >> Mensheviks, Trotskyities, socialists of various stripes, etc. in the
>> > early
>> > >> part of the 20th century. They would have been happy to see these
>> > deviants
>> > >> burned at the stake. (Trotsky indeed was assasinated, and others 
>> > >> also
>> > >> fell.)
>> > >>
>> > >> --mkb On Aug 3, 2010, at 5:16 PM, Robert Naiman wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >>> Campaigning for President, Senator Obama said: "I don't want to 
>> > >>> just
>> > end
>> > >>> the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the
>> > first
>> > >>> place." But as Andrew Bacevich notes in his new book, "Washington
>> > Rules:
>> > >>> America's Path to Permanent War," as President, Obama has done the
>> > >>> opposite: he has promoted and acted on behalf of the mindset that 
>> > >>> leads
>> > >>> to
>> > >>> war. Bacevich's book is a call for Americans to reject the 
>> > >>> Washington
>> > >>> consensus for permanent war, global counterinsurgency and global
>> > military
>> > >>> power projection, and to demand instead that America "come home," 
>> > >>> as
>> > >>> Martin
>> > >>> Luther King called for in 1967, and focus on resolving its own 
>> > >>> domestic
>> > >>> problems rather than act as a self-appointed global police and
>> > occupation
>> > >>> force. Because of his personal background and establishment
>> > credentials,
>> > >>> Bacevich may be able to move Americans currently beyond the reach 
>> > >>> of
>> > the
>> > >>> peace movement. This is important, because a key task for ending 
>> > >>> our
>> > >>> current wars and preventing future ones is to break the current
>> > >>> near-monolithic support for permanent war among the dominant
>> > institutions
>> > >>> of the Republican Party - a stance that effectively disenfranchises 
>> > >>> the
>> > >>> substantial minority of Republican voters who oppose the permanent 
>> > >>> war.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> This is why Bacevich's new book is potentially important for the 
>> > >>> U.S.
>> > >>> peace
>> > >>> movement. Get the book, read it, give it to a Republican friend, 
>> > >>> and
>> > talk
>> > >>> to them about it. Join Just Foreign Policy on September 24th for a
>> > >>> "Virtual
>> > >>> Brown Bag" with Andrew Bacevich, and try to virtually bring your
>> > >>> Republican
>> > >>> friend.
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Robert Naiman
>> > Policy Director
>> > Just Foreign Policy
>> > www.justforeignpolicy.org
>> > naiman at justforeignpolicy.org<http://mc/compose?to=naiman@justforeignpolicy.org>
>> >
>> > Urge Congress to Support a Timetable for Military Withdrawal from
>> > Afghanistan
>> > http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Peace-discuss mailing list
>> > Peace-discuss at lists.chambana.net<http://mc/compose?to=Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net>
>> > http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Robert Naiman
>> Policy Director
>> Just Foreign Policy
>> www.justforeignpolicy.org
>> naiman at justforeignpolicy.org
>>
>> Urge Congress to Support a Timetable for Military Withdrawal from
>> Afghanistan
>> http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern
>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Peace-discuss mailing list
>> Peace-discuss at lists.chambana.net
>> http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss
>
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