[Peace-discuss] Parsing the White House Statement on the Iran Nuclear Fuel Swap Deal

[C. G. Estabrook]

The administration's actual response:

http://www.nytimes.com/?emc=na


On 5/18/10 8:59 AM, Robert Naiman wrote:
>
> http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/its-gollllllll-for-lula-a_b_578390.html
>
>
> [as an update on yesterday's post]
>
> http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/5/18/995/00833
>
> http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/581
>
>
> Perhaps I still have a bit too much of that "hopey-changey" Kool-Aid in
> my bloodstream, but I read the White House statement in response to the
> Iran-Turkey-Brazil announcement as saying to Iran: "We acknowledge that
> you moved. We're still ready to deal, and we'll see you in Geneva."
>
> The White House statement is here
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-iran>:
>
> I think it's fair to assume that a good deal of thought went into
> crafting this statement. Robert Gibbs did not come up with these words
> on his own. The folks in the Obama Administration who run nuclear
> diplomacy chose these words.
>
> So what words did they choose, and what should we infer from them?
>
>    1. "We acknowledge the efforts that have been made by Turkey and Brazil."
>
> This is positive. Regardless of what the Obama Administration said
> before the President of Brazil went to Iran, what the Obama
> Administration is saying now is: "Mazl Tov! Parabens! Tebrikler!" This
> is good. If you want a deal, the role of Brazil and Turkey is positive,
> not negative. Clearly, the involvement of Brazil and Turkey is raising
> the comfort level of the Iranians with the fuel swap deal. That's a good
> thing that should be encouraged. If you want a deal, you want the other
> side to be comfortable with the deal. Plus, now Brazil and Turkey have
> skin in the game. If Iran reneges, it's going to make Brazil and Turkey
> look bad. That's good. We are now in a situation where it's not "P5+1"
> on one side of the table and Iran on the other, but P5+1 on one side of
> the table and Iran+2 on the other. If your goal is to isolate Iran,
> that's bad. But if your goal it's to get a deal, that's good. The more
> signatures there are on the paper, the stronger the deal is.
>
>    2. "The proposal announced in Tehran must now be conveyed clearly and
>       authoritatively to the IAEA before it can be considered by the
>       international community."
>
> This is perfectly reasonable, and in fact welcoming. "The proposal must
> be sent to Geneva before it can be considered" means "when you send this
> proposal to Geneva, I am going to consider it." Iran has said it will
> formally submit this proposal in a week.
>
>    3. "Given Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments,
>       and the need to address fundamental issues related to Iran’s
>       nuclear program, the United States and international community
>       continue to have serious concerns."
>
> The issue isn't resolved yet. No news there.
>
>    4. "While it would be a positive step for Iran to transfer
>       low-enriched uranium off of its soil as it agreed to do last
>       October, Iran said today that it would continue its 20%
>       enrichment, which is a direct violation of UN Security Council
>       resolutions and which the Iranian government originally justified
>       by pointing to the need for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor."
>
> This is the most interesting sentence to me in the White House statement.
>
> First, it re-affirms that the transfer of LEU out of Iran is positive.
> It makes no reference to the purported issue that due to subsequent
> enrichment, the absolute amount of LEU represented by the October deal
> has fallen as a percentage of Iran's LEU stockpile. Instead, it focuses
> on the 20% enrichment, "which is a direct violation of UN Security
> Council resolutions and which the Iranian government originally
> justified by pointing to the need for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor."
>
> This is a very interesting choice of words, because while it is of
> course absolutely true that Iran's 20% enrichment "is a direct violation
> of UN Security Council resolutions," as everyone knows, *any Iranian
> enrichment of uranium whatsoever* is just as much of "a direct violation
> of UN Security Council resolutions" as 20% enrichment. So, while
> pounding the table about "Iranian enrichment," the Obama Administration
> is making a deliberate choice to only pound the table about 20%
> enrichment, which is a billion times more reasonable than pounding the
> table about enrichment per se.
>
> Regardless of what one thinks about the intrinsic signifance of 20%
> enrichment - this enrichment is under IAEA inspection, after all - as a
> political matter, 1) Iran was not doing 20% enrichment at the time of
> the October negotiation, 2) the Administration correctly notes that Iran
> said it was doing 20% enrichment to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor,
> and so, as the Administration's statement implies, *in terms of meeting
> Iran's needs, if there is a fuel swap deal, Iran should be willing to
> /suspend 20% enrichment/*, and in any event 3) Iran's decision to go to
> 20% enrichment was universally interpreted as an Iranian pressure tactic
> to push the West on negotiations around the fuel deal (Iran is not
> believed to have the technology to use the 20% enriched uranium as fuel
> in its medical research reactor), so again, if that was the goal of the
> Iranian move, then Iran should be willing to back off of 20% enrichment
> as part of a deal on the fuel swap.
>
>    5. "Furthermore, the Joint Declaration issued in Tehran is vague
>       about Iran’s willingness to meet with the P5+1 countries to
>       address international concerns about its nuclear program, as it
>       also agreed to do last October."
>
> Which merely reaffirms that the goal of all this was to support the P5+1
> negotiation, so if that negotiation does not go forward, the fuel swap
> deal doesn't have any meaning. Again, no news here.
>
> In sum, I read the Administration statement as saying: we'll see you in
> Geneva, and when we see you in Geneva, we're going to ask you about two
> things: 20% enrichment, and the ongoing dialogue with the P5+1 about
> your nuclear program. And if we get satisfaction on these points, we can
> still have a deal.
>
> Of course, it will be pointed out to us that all of this is "only" about
> an /interim/ deal, to tide us over, to slow down the clock, to
> deescalate tensions and build confidence for the main negotiation. So?
> The beauty and significance of the fuel swap deal /*which was proposed
> by the United States*/ was that the US was making clear to Iran that the
> US was willing to talk about /*other means by which Iran could establish
> international confidence in its nuclear intentions*/ besides the
> non-starter demand of suspension of enrichment. If this is still the US
> position, then there is a plausible path to a meaningful negotiation.
>
>
> --
> Robert Naiman
> Policy Director
> Just Foreign Policy
> www.justforeignpolicy.org <http://www.justforeignpolicy.org>
> naiman at justforeignpolicy.org <mailto:naiman at justforeignpolicy.org>
>
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> Afghanistan
> http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern

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