[Peace-discuss] Murder & lies

[C. G. Estabrook]

"...the fact that Gen. Petraeus has brought back the use of heavy US airstrikes 
and is increasing night raids and other direct actions by Special Operations 
Forces could be seen as a sign of either fierce determination to wipe out 'the 
enemy' or of desperation to prove the US and its allies are 'winning.' Over the 
past three months, NATO claims that Special Operations Forces' night raids have 
resulted in more than 360 'insurgent leaders' being killed or captured along 
with 960 'lower-level' leaders and the capture of more than 2400 'lower-level' 
fighters. In July, Special Operations Forces averaged 5 raids a night. Now, 
according to NATO, they are conducting an average of 17 ... '[Karzai's] got to 
understand that I've got a bunch of young men and women ... who are in a foreign 
country being shot at and having to traverse terrain filled with IEDs, and they 
need to protect themselves,' Obama said."


Published on Monday, November 22, 2010 by The Nation
America's Failed War of Attrition in Afghanistan
by Jeremy Scahill

At the end of the NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal this weekend, the leadership 
of the Afghan Taliban issued a statement characterizing the alliance's adoption 
of a loose timeline for a 2014 end to combat operations as "good news" for 
Afghans and "a sign of failure for the American government." At the summit, 
President Barack Obama said that 2011 will begin "a transition to full Afghan 
lead" in security operations, while the Taliban declared: "In the past nine 
years, the invaders could not establish any system of governance in Kabul and 
they will never be able to do so in future."

While Obama claimed that the US and its allies are "breaking the Taliban's 
momentum," the reality on the ground tells a different story. Despite increased 
Special Operations Forces raids and, under Gen. David Petraeus, a return to 
regular US-led airstrikes, the insurgency in Afghanistan is spreading and 
growing stronger. "By killing Taliban leaders the war will not come to an end," 
said the Taliban's former foreign minister, Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, in an 
interview at his home in Kabul. "On the contrary, things get worse which will 
give birth to more leaders." Former and current Taliban leaders say that they 
have seen a swelling in the Taliban ranks since 9-11. In part, they say, this 
can be attributed to a widely held perception that the Karzai government is 
corrupt and illegitimate and that Afghans--primarily ethnic Pashtuns--want 
foreign occupation forces out. "We are only fighting to make foreigners leave 
Afghanistan," a new Taliban commander in Kunduz told me during my recent trip to 
the country. "We don't want to fight after the withdrawal of foreigners, but as 
long as there are foreigners, we won't talk to Karzai."

While Obama claimed that the US and its allies are "breaking the Taliban's 
momentum," the reality on the ground tells a different story. Despite increased 
Special Operations Forces raids and, under Gen. David Petraeus, a return to 
regular US-led airstrikes, the insurgency in Afghanistan is spreading and 
growing stronger. (AP Photo) "The Americans have very sophisticated technology, 
but the problem here in Afghanistan is they are confronting ideology. I think 
ideology is stronger than technology," says Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former senior 
member of Mullah Mohammed Omar's government. "If I am a Taliban and I'm killed, 
I'm martyred, then I'm successful. There are no regrets for the Taliban. It's 
very difficult to defeat this kind of idea."

But it is not simply a matter of ideology versus technology. The Taliban is not 
one unified body. The Afghan insurgency is fueled by fighters with a wide 
variety of motivations. Some are the dedicated jihadists of which Zaeef speaks, 
but others are fighting to defend their land or are seeking revenge for the 
killing of family members by NATO or Afghan forces. While al Qaeda has been 
almost entirely expelled from Afghanistan, the insurgency still counts a small 
number of non-Afghans among its ranks. Bolstering the Taliban's recruitment 
efforts is the perception in Afghanistan that the Taliban pays better than NATO 
or the Afghan army or police.

The hard reality US officials don't want to discuss is this: the cultural and 
religious values of much of the Pashtun population--which comprises 25-40% of 
the country--more closely align with those of the Taliban than they do with 
Afghan government or US/NATO forces. The Taliban operate a shadow government in 
large swaths of the Pashtun areas of the country, complete with governors and a 
court system. In rural areas, land and property disputes are resolved through 
the Taliban system rather than the Afghan government, which is widely 
distrusted. "The objectives and goal of the American troops in Afghanistan are 
not clear to the people and therefore Afghans call the Americans 'invaders,'" 
says Muttawakil. "Democracy is a very new phenomenon in Afghanistan and most 
people don't know the meaning of democracy. And now corruption, thieves and 
fakes have defamed democracy. Democracy can't be imposed because people will 
never adopt any value by force."

The US strategy of attempting to force the Taliban to surrender or engage in 
negotiations rests almost exclusively on attempts to decapitate the Taliban 
leadership. While Taliban leaders acknowledge that commanders are regularly 
killed, they say the targeted killings are producing more radical leaders who 
are far less likely to negotiate than the older school Taliban leaders who 
served in the government of Mullah Mohammed Omar. "If today Mullah Omar was 
captured or killed, the fighting will go on," says Zaeef, adding: " It will be 
worse for everyone if the [current] Taliban leadership disappears."

In October, there were a flurry of media reports that senior Taliban leaders 
were negotiating with the Karzai government and that US forces were helping to 
insure safe passage for the Taliban leaders to come to Kabul. The Taliban 
passionately refuted those reports, saying they were propaganda aimed at 
dividing the insurgency. Last week the Taliban appeared vindicated on this point 
as Karzai spoke in markedly modest terms on the issue. He told the Washington 
Post that three months ago he had met with one or two "very high" level Taliban 
leaders. He characterized the meeting as "the exchange of desires for peace," 
saying the Taliban "feel the same as we do here - that too many people are 
suffering for no reason."

Contrary to the rhetoric emanating from NATO and Washington, the Taliban are not 
on the ropes and, from their perspective, would gain nothing from negotiating 
with the US or NATO. As far as they are concerned, time is on their side. "The 
bottom line for [NATO and the US] is to immediately implement what they would 
ultimately have to implement... after colossal casualties," stated the Taliban 
declaration after the recent NATO summit. "They should not postpone withdrawal 
of their forces."

Depending on who you ask, the fact that Gen. Petraeus has brought back the use 
of heavy US airstrikes and is increasing night raids and other direct actions by 
Special Operations Forces could be seen as a sign of either fierce determination 
to wipe out "the enemy" or of desperation to prove the US and its allies are 
"winning." Over the past three months, NATO claims that Special Operations 
Forces' night raids have resulted in more than 360 "insurgent leaders" being 
killed or captured along with 960 "lower-level" leaders and the capture of more 
than 2400 "lower-level" fighters. In July, Special Operations Forces averaged 5 
raids a night. Now, according to NATO, they are conducting an average of 17. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the raids "intelligence-driven 
precision operations against high value insurgents and their networks," adding, 
"There is no question that they are having a significant  impact on the 
insurgent leadership."

The raids undoubtedly have produced scores of successful kill or capture 
operations, but serious questions abound over the NATO definitions of Taliban 
commanders, sub-commanders and foot soldiers. Most significantly, the raids 
consistently result in the killing of innocent civilians, a fact that is 
problematic for NATO and the Karzai government. "A lot of times, yeah, the right 
guys would get targeted and the right guys would get killed," says Matthew Hoh a 
former senior State Department official in Afghanistan who resigned in 2009 in 
protest of US war strategy. "Plenty of other times, the wrong people would get 
killed. Sometimes it would be innocent families." Hoh, who was the senior US 
civilian in Zabul province, a Taliban stronghold, describes night raids as "a 
really risky, really violent operation," saying that when Special Operations 
Forces conduct them, "We might get that one guy we're looking for or we might 
kill a bunch of innocent people and now make ten more Taliban out of them."

Hoh describes the current use of US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan as 
a "tremendous waste of resources," saying, "They are the best strike forces the 
world's ever known. They're very well trained, very well equipped, have a 
tremendous amount of support, and we've got them in Afghanistan chasing after 
mid-level Taliban leaders who are not threatening the United States, who are 
only fighting us really because we're in their valley."

In an interview with The Washington Post in mid-November, President Karzai 
called for an end to the night raids. "I don't like it in any manner and the 
Afghan people don't like these raids in any manner," Karzai said. "We don't like 
raids in our homes. This is a problem between us and I hope this ends as soon as 
possible. ... Terrorism is not invading Afghan homes and fighting terrorism is 
not being intrusive in the daily Afghan life."

Karzai's comments angered the Obama administration. At the NATO summit, 
President Obama acknowledged that civilian deaths have sparked "real tensions" 
with the Karzai government, but reserved the right to continue US raids. 
"[Karzai's] got to understand that I've got a bunch of young men and women... 
who are in a foreign country being shot at and having to traverse terrain filled 
with IEDs, and they need to protect themselves," Obama said. "So if we're 
setting things up where they're just sitting ducks for the Taliban, that's not 
an acceptable answer either." Republican Senator Lindsey Graham blasted Karzai's 
statement calling for an end to night raids, saying, "it would be a disaster for 
the Petraeus strategy."

Along with Afghan government corruption, including a cabal of war lords, drug 
dealers and war criminals in key positions, the so-called Petraeus strategy of 
ratcheting up air strikes and expanding night raids is itself delivering 
substantial blows to the stated US counterinsurgency strategy and the 
much-discussed battle for hearts and minds. The raids and airstrikes are 
premiere recruiting points for the Taliban and, unlike Sen. Graham and the Obama 
administration, Karzai seems to get that. In the bigger picture, the US appears 
to be trying to kill its way to a passable definition of a success or even 
victory. This strategy puts a premium on the number of kills and captures of 
anyone who can loosely be defined as an insurgent and completely sidelines the 
blowback these operations cause. "We found ourselves in this Special Operations 
form of attrition warfare," says Hoh, "which is kind of like an oxymoron, 
because Special Operations are not supposed to be in attrition warfare. But 
we've found ourselves in that in Afghanistan."

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