[Peace-discuss] No permanent enemies, just permanent interests

[E. Wayne Johnson]

I'd like to see an option on the 1040 form to donate a
to the terrorist organization of one's choice.

42.  Would you like to donate $2  to one of the following terrorist 
organizations?
         If so, please check one (only one):

        ( )  al-Qaeda
        ( )  Hamas
        ( )  Sinn Fein
        ( )  Sean Penn
        ( )  Drunken Rednecks with Guns
        ( )  AIPAC

*
Ok, ok.  Some of those are sworn enemies of the American people.
Which makes them no different from the presidential candidates.

*

43.  Have you ever had the Chicken Pox?

      ( ) y  ( ) n

      If so, how many? _________


On 7/27/2012 6:39 PM, C. G. Estabrook wrote:
> "BAN, BAN, TALIBAN / HAS A NEW MASTER: GET A NEW MAN"
>
> The ironies are replete. The US, surreptitiously fighting on the side 
> of al-Qaeda to overthrow the Alewite government in Syria, is quietly 
> arranging with the Taliban to oppose together al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, 
> according to Anatol Lieven.
>
> AQ owes its existence to the US, descending as it does from the 
> fanatical and ruthless Islamists whom the Carter administration 
> gathered together and sent into Afghanistan in the 1970s (before the 
> Russian invasion) "to give to the USSR its Vietnam war," as Zbigniew 
> Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, said. "What is 
> most important to the history of the world?" he asked later. "The 
> Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems 
> or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?"
>
> When the stirred-up Muslims counterattacked on 9/11/2001 for a 
> generation of US depredations of the Mideast - for murderous sanctions 
> against Iraq, suppression of the Palestinians, and the military 
> investment of Saudi Arabia, as AQ claimed - the US launched what 
> George Bush called a "crusade" against "terrorists" - i.e., against 
> the armed opposition to a generation-long US attempt to control the 
> energy producing regions of the world.
>
> But the terrorists are not homogeneous, and Lieven points here to the 
> gap between the Afghan national resistance to foreign invasion - the 
> Taliban - and the international terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda. "... 
> on certain key issues the Taliban leadership and the US administration 
> are far closer than most analysts believe. The chief obstacle to 
> a peace settlement is likely to come not from Taliban links to 
> al-Qaeda but rather from the question of how to divide up power within 
> Afghanistan."
>
> US policy - as flexible in strategy as it is in ethics, as torture 
> and assassination make clear - is consistent as to goals: the 
> Obama administration will work both with and against al-Qaeda, the 
> great Satan of the War on Terrorism (or as the Obamanians prefer to 
> call their broader and more brutal version, "overseas 
> contingency operations") its object all sublime to achieve in time - 
> control of the Mideast.  --CGE
>
> ========
> /http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/45b83f50-d59b-11e1-af40-00144feabdc0.html#axzz21obxqphU/
>
> July 25, 2012 7:57 pm
> Lessons from my talks with the Taliban
> By Anatol Lieven
>
> To judge by discussions I had with figures close to the Afghan 
> Taliban in Dubai last week, on certain key issues the Taliban 
> leadership and the US administration are far closer than most analysts 
> believe. The chief obstacle to a peace settlement is likely to come 
> not from Taliban links to al-Qaeda but rather from the question of how 
> to divide up power within Afghanistan.
> My colleagues and I spoke with four people: two former members of 
> the Taliban government (one of them a founder member of the movement), 
> a senior former Mujahedin commander with close ties to the Taliban, 
> and a non-official Afghan mediator with the Taliban. All emphasised 
> the realism of the Taliban leadership, born of their experiences of 
> the past decade, and their willingness to break with al-Qaeda and 
> exclude it and other international terrorist groups from areas under 
> their control.
> All said that Taliban commanders and fighters would accept such an 
> order if it came from Mullah Omar. A former Taliban minister 
> said that reports of a continued presence of al-Qaeda elements could 
> be referred to a joint commission of Isaf, the Taliban and the 
> Afghan government, which would verify the reports and decide what 
> action to take.
> Such action might even be taken by US troops within Afghanistan. 
> For perhaps the most striking thing to emerge from our 
> discussions was that three of our four interviewees said the Taliban 
> would consider agreeing to US bases and military advisers in 
> Afghanistan after 2014 – something that contradicts every previous 
> Taliban statement.
> However, all our interviewees emphasised that the Taliban would only 
> agree to this as part of an overall peace settlement and that 
> they “will never accept anything that looks like surrender”. They also 
> all said the Taliban would be willing to commit to continuing 
> existing health and education programmes, including for women, as long 
> as separation of men and women was guaranteed.
> This new pragmatism includes acceptance of the present 
> Afghan constitution. All our interlocutors said the Taliban had no 
> serious problem with the constitution as such – but would never agree 
> to it as a precondition of talks, as hitherto demanded by 
> Washington. They expect the constitution to be debated and approved as 
> part of a national debate including themselves.
> All this is very encouraging. However, it reflects something else, 
> which is essential for a settlement, but much more problematic. 
> The Taliban like the present, highly centralised constitution because 
> they want a strong central government in which they will play a 
> leading part. They do not expect this to be an exclusive part. Three 
> interviewees said the Taliban knew they could not govern without 
> other forces’ participation, and that government must include educated 
> technocrats. They want a strong national army – even one trained 
> by the US – to hold Afghanistan together, prevent a return to warlord 
> rule and deter interference by neighbours.
> But with whom would the Taliban be willing to share power? 
> Our interviewees said that the Taliban recognised the need to 
> guarantee a share of power to other groups from the existing regime, 
> but were vague on which those groups might be. All said that 
> particular “very corrupt and brutal people” would be utterly 
> unacceptable, but that others, less compromised, could take part.
> Above all, they stressed the Taliban will never accept Hamid Karzai as 
> a legitimate interlocutor, or participate in a grand national assembly 
> or national elections while he is president. They fear – with good 
> reason, given his record – that he would rig these processes.
> So this apparent new pragmatism leaves two huge questions open. 
> The first is whether the Taliban could possibly agree to the US 
> using bases in Afghanistan to continue drone attacks and raids against 
> al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such an agreement would outrage 
> many Pashtuns and give Pakistan a strong motive to wreck any peace 
> settlement through its allies in the Haqqani network; while our 
> interviewees stressed the Taliban’s obedience to Mullah Omar and his 
> comrades, they were studiously evasive about the Haqqanis.
> The second question is whether, or how, Washington could agree to 
> force its existing Afghan allies to accept a deal with the Taliban 
> that would exclude many of them from power. Would a promise of 
> luxurious retirement to the US or the Gulf be enough to persuade them?
> Above all, any settlement will end the rule of Mr Karzai and his clan. 
> An agreement on this between Washington and the Taliban is 
> not impossible, given the contempt for Mr Karzai felt by many leading 
> US officials and soldiers. Many in Washington oppose the idea of 
> him trying to arrange a succession to the presidency for a family member.
> So there seems real room for agreement on a caretaker government 
> of neutral figures to supervise constitutional discussions leading 
> to elections. But with the next elections due in 2014, there is not 
> much time to lose. As soon as the US presidential elections are 
> over, Washington should do its best to open substantial talks with 
> the Taliban and find out whether what we heard in Dubai really 
> does represent their position and can be the basis for peace.
> /The writer is a professor in the War Studies Department of 
> King’s College London. His latest book is ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’/
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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