[Peace-discuss] Fwd: from Jonathan Glover 2/05/03
Ricky Baldwin
baldwinricky at yahoo.com
Wed Feb 5 07:19:43 CST 2003
--- Robert McKim <r-mckim at uiuc.edu> wrote:
> Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2003 22:28:26 -0600
> To: baldwinricky at yahoo.com
> From: Robert McKim <r-mckim at uiuc.edu>
> Subject: from Jonathan Glover 2/05/03
>
> Ricky, This is quite a good essay; if you agree you
> may want to
> forward it to the entire AWARE group. Regards,
> Robert
>
>
>
>
> >
> >Can we justify killing the children of Iraq?
> >
> >If we go to war with Saddam, thousands of children
> will die. So why
> >aren't we agonising over this in the way we would
> the possible death
> >of a child in Britain? Jonathan Glover argues that
> we do not have
> >the moral authority to start such a conflict
> >
> >Wednesday February 5, 2003
> >The Guardian
> >
> >I have spent the past few years discussing medical
> ethics with
> >students who are often doctors or nurses. Their
> work involves them
> >in life-and-death decisions. Our discussions have
> reminded me of
> >what many of us experience when we are close to
> someone in acute
> >medical crisis. When a parent is dying slowly in
> distress or
> >indignity, or when a baby is born with such severe
> disabilities that
> >life may be a burden, the family and the medical
> team agonise over
> >whether to continue life support. No one finds such
> a decision easy
> >or reaches it lightly. What is at stake is too
> serious for anyone to
> >rush the discussion.
> >
> >It is hard not to be struck by the contrast between
> these painful
> >deliberations and the hasty way people think about
> a war in which
> >thousands will be killed. The people killed in an
> attack on Iraq
> >will not be so different from those in hospital
> whose lives we treat
> >so seriously. Some will be old; many will be babies
> and children. To
> >think of just one five-year-old Iraqi girl, who may
> die in this war,
> >as we would think of that same girl in a medical
> crisis is to see
> >the enormous burden of proof on those who would
> justify killing her.
> >Decisions for war seem less agonising than the
> decision to let a
> >girl in hospital die. But only because anonymity
> and distance numb
> >the moral imagination.
> >
> >Questions about war are not so different from other
> life-and-death
> >decisions. War kills many people, but each person
> has a life no more
> >to be lightly destroyed than that of a child in
> hospital. This moral
> >seriousness of killing is reflected in the ethics
> of war. If a war
> >is to be justified, at least two conditions have to
> be met. The war
> >has to prevent horrors worse than it will cause.
> And, as a means of
> >prevention, it has to be the last resort. Killing
> people should not
> >be considered until all alternative means have been
> tried - and have
> >failed.
> >
> >Those supporting the proposed war on Iraq have
> claimed that it will
> >avert the greater horror of terrorist use of
> biological or nuclear
> >weapons. But this raises questions not properly
> answered. It is not
> >yet clear whether Iraq even has these weapons, or
> whether their
> >having them would be more of a threat than
> possession by other
> >countries with equally horrible regimes, such as
> North Korea. No
> >good evidence has been produced of any link to
> terrorist groups.
> >Above all, there is no evidence of any serious
> exploration by the
> >American or British governments of any means less
> terrible than war.
> >Is it impossible to devise some combination of
> diplomacy and
> >continuing inspection to deal with any possible
> threat? Is killing
> >Iraqis really the only means left to us?
> >
> >The weak answers given to these questions by the
> two governments
> >proposing war explain why they have persuaded so
> few people in the
> >rest of Europe, or even in this country. It is
> heartening how few
> >are persuaded by claims about intelligence too
> secret to reveal, or
> >by the attempts to hurry us into war by leaders who
> say their
> >patience is exhausted. We would never agree to
> removing the baby's
> >life support on the basis of medical information
> too confidential
> >for the doctor to tell us. Still less would we
> accept this because
> >the doctor's patience has run out. It really does
> seem that this
> >time many of us are thinking about war with
> something like the same
> >seriousness.
> >There is an extra dimension to the decision about
> this particular
> >war. The choice made this time may be one of the
> most important
> >decisions about war ever made. This is partly
> because of the great
> >risks of even a "successful" war. The defeat even
> of Saddam
> >Hussein's cruel dictatorship may contribute to
> long-term enmity and
> >conflict between the west and the Islamic world. In
> what is widely
> >thought in the Islamic world to be both an
> unjustified war and an
> >attack on Islam, an American victory may be seen as
> an Islamic
> >humiliation to be avenged. This war may do for our
> century what 1914
> >did for the 20th century. And there is an ominous
> sense of our
> >leaders, as in 1914, being dwarfed by the scale of
> events and
> >sleepwalking into decisions with implications far
> more serious than
> >they understand.
> >
> >The other reason for the special seriousness of the
> decision about
> >this war has to do with the dangerous
> post-September 11 world we
> >live in. That day showed how much damage a low-tech
> terrorist attack
> >can do to even the most heavily armed country. The
> US was like a
> >bull, able to defeat any other bull it locked horns
> with, but
> >suddenly unable to defend itself against a swarm of
> bees. All
> >countries are vulnerable to such attacks. Combining
> this thought
> >with the proliferation of biological weapons, and
> possibly of
> >portable nuclear weapons, suggests a very
> frightening world.
> >This dangerous world is often seen as part of the
> argument in
> >support of the war. If we don't act now, won't the
> problem, as Tony
> >Blair said, "come back to haunt future
> generations"? But further
> >thought may raise doubts about whether the
> dangerous world of
> >terrorism and proliferation really counts for the
> war rather than
> >against it.
> >
> >The frightening world we live in is like the "state
> of nature"
> >described by Thomas Hobbes. What made life in the
> state of nature
> >"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" was the
> strength of the
> >reasons people had to fight each other. There was
> no ruler to keep
> >the peace. So everyone knew the strong would attack
> the weak for
> >their possessions. But the instability was worse
> than this. My fear
> >of attack by you gives me a reason for a
> pre-emptive strike against
> >you before you get strong enough to start. But my
> reason for a
> >pre-emptive strike against you in turn gives you a
> reason for a
> >pre-emptive strike against me. And so the spiral of
> fear and
> >violence goes on. Hobbes thought the only solution
> was the creation
> >of Leviathan, a ruler with absolute power. Such a
> ruler could impose
> >a peace otherwise unobtainable. The dangers of
> tyranny and injustice
> >are outweighed by the dangers of a world where no
> one has power to
> >impose peace.
> >
> >Our present international world seems alarmingly
> like the Hobbesian
> >state of nature. Nations (and perhaps at least as
> frighteningly,
> >small groups such as al-Qaida) have many motives
> for attack and our
> >protection is flimsy. The pure Hobbesian solution
> to this would be a
> >social contract between all such states and groups,
> giving all power
> >to one to act as absolute ruler. This is unlikely
> to happen. But
> >there is a naturally evolving equivalent. Sometimes
> one dominant
> >power emerges, and imposes Pax Romana or Pax
> Britannicus or, in our
> >time, Pax Americana. The Hobbesian suggestion is
> that, as the way
> >out of the law of the jungle, we should welcome the
> emergence of a
> >superpower that dominates the world.
> >
> >In his book, Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant saw
> that the Hobbesian
> >solution was not the best possible. The Hobbesian
> ruler has no moral
> >authority. His only claim to impose peace is his
> strength. Conflict
> >is not eliminated, but suppressed by sheer
> strength. If the ruler
> >grows weak, the conflict will surface again.
> >
> >This applies to the international world. A
> superpower with an empire
> >may suppress conflict. But, as Pax Romana and Pax
> Britannicus remind
> >us, empires fall as well as rise. Such a peace is
> unlikely to last
> >for ever. And empires act at least partly out of
> self-interest, so
> >the imposed arrangements may not be just.
> Palestinians, for
> >instance, may be unhappy to entrust their future to
> Pax Americana.
> >But absolutely central is the lack of moral
> authority of anything
> >imposed by force. To put it crudely, no one
> appointed the US, or the
> >US and Britain, or Nato, to be world policeman.
> >
> >Kant's solution was a world federation of
> nation-states. They would
> >agree to give the federation a monopoly of the use
> of force. This
> >use of force would have a moral authority derived
> from its
> >impartiality and from its being set up by
> agreement. In the present
> >world, the Kantian solution might be a proper UN
> police force, with
> >adequate access to funds and to force of
> overwhelming strength.
> >There would have to be agreed criteria for its
> intervention,
> >together with a court to interpret those criteria
> and to authorise
> >intervention. There are many problems with this
> solution. But
> >something like it is the only way of policing the
> global village
> >with impartiality and authority. It is the only
> hope of permanently
> >bringing to an end the cycle of violence.
> >A central decision of our time is between these two
> ways of trying
> >to keep the peace in the global village. In a
> Hobbesian village,
> >violence is quelled by a posse rounded up from the
> strongest
> >villagers. It is a Texas cowboy village, or
> Sicilian village with
> >mafia gangs. In a Kantian village, there is a
> strong police force,
> >backed up by the authority of law and the courts.
> The Kantian
> >village may seem utopian. But there are reasons for
> thinking it is
> >not impossible. In the first half of the 20th
> century, Europe gave
> >the world colonialism, genocide and two world wars.
> Then it would
> >have seemed utopian to think of the present
> European Union. Through
> >pressure of experiencing the alternative, a
> federation did come
> >about. With luck, Kant's proposal may come about
> because we see the
> >importance of not experiencing what is likely to be
> a really
> >terrible alternative.
> >
> >For all its inadequacies, the UN is the embryonic
> form of the rule
> >of law in the world. This is another reason why the
> proposed war
> >could be so disastrous. Every time Bush or Blair
> say they will not
> >be bound by a security council veto, without
> knowing it they are
> >Hobbesians. Never mind moral authority: we, the
> powerful, will
> >decide what happens. If we want to make a
> pre-emptive strike, we
> >will do so. And we will listen to the UN provided
> it says what we
> >tell it to say.
> >Some of us fear the instability of a world of
> unauthorised
> >pre-emptive strikes. We hope our precarious
> situation may nudge
> >world leaders further towards the rule of law,
> towards giving more
> >authority and power to the UN. The alternative is
> terrifying. This
> >gives an extra dimension of menace to the attitude
> of the American
> >and British governments to this crisis. The erosion
> of the world's
> >attempt at international authority is something to
> add to the
> >cruelty and killing of this lawless war we are
> being asked to
> >support.
> >
> >· Jonathan Glover is director of the Centre of
> Medical Law and
> >Ethics at King's College, London, and author of
> Humanity: A Moral
> >History of the 20th Century.
>
>
>
>
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