[Peace-discuss] New AWARE pamphlet on Bush nuclear weapons policies

[ppatton at uiuc.edu]

Here is a draft of the text for the new AWARE pamphlet on 
Bush nuclear weapons policies I am writing.  The text is 
below, and I have also attached the draft as a word document.
Al, I am sending this to you separately also because Ricky 
said that you and Susan Davis currently constitute AWARE's 
literature committee.  Please forward this to Susan as I 
don't have her e-mail address.



Bush Nuclear Weapons Policy: A Grave and Gathering Danger
by Paul Patton

“No problem can be solved by the same consciousness that 
created it” - Albert Einstein

“Put up thy sword, for they that live by the sword shall die 
by the sword” -Jesus of Nazareth

The Choice:  Cooperation or Dominance
The very survival of the human species may depend on 
controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons.  The end of the 
cold war brings new opportunities for nuclear disarmament 
through cooperative agreements between nations.  The Bush 
administration has chosen another path, which it says will 
lead to peace: unilateral US military world dominance [1-3].  
“Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential 
adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in the hopes of 
surpassing or equaling the power of the United States”, Bush 
proclaimed in his “National Security Strategy of the United 
States” [4].  As Bush pursues this goal, his actions threaten 
to wreak the delicate framework of international treaties 
erected to stem the spread of nuclear arms, and could trigger 
a new global nuclear arms race.

The cold war’s legacy
As of 2002, the United States still maintained a stockpile of  
more than 10,600 nuclear warheads, including more than 8000 
active duty warheads poised for launch towards Russia on a 
moment’s notice [5].  The Russians likewise maintain a large 
nuclear arsenal targeting the US.  “The greatest nuclear 
danger to the United States today and in the near future is a 
Russian attack resulting from an error in Russia’s warning 
system or a failure in its command-and-control system” 
concludes a Union of Concerned Scientists report (UCS) [6].  
The Bush administration has adopted a “go slow” approach to 
reducing these arsenals.  Bush’s informal agreement with 
Russia, the Treaty of Moscow, would leave more than 2000 US 
warheads on active duty by 2012 [7].  At American insistence, 
the treaty doesn’t require the destruction of any warheads, 
and the US plans to store decommissioned warheads as a ready 
reserve.   The Bush Administration wants to keep a reserve 
because, in the words of a report by nuclear experts close 
to 
the administration “There is no basis for expecting that the 
conditions that may permit deep nuclear reductions today will 
continue in the future” [8].   Clinging to Cold War fears, 
however, worsens a threat that is already grave.  If the US 
places its nuclear weapons in storage, instead of destroying 
them, Russia will be forced to do likewise.  “In Russia, 
plagued for years by security problems, the threat of warhead 
theft from a warehouse is much greater than the threat of 
warhead theft from a silo” concludes a UCS backgrounder [7].   
Russia is the most likely place in today’s world for 
terrorists to get nuclear materials.  The Russian stockpile 
includes hundreds of thousands of pounds of weapons-grade 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  Less than 100 pounds, 
in the hands of terrorists, could be used to make a simple 
bomb like the one that destroyed Hiroshima [9].   Russia’s 
nuclear security systems are outdated and the massive 
workforce running its nuclear weapons complex is underpaid.  
It has open borders with countries in which terrorists are 
active [10].  
In 1991, the US and Russia launched the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program to lock up former Soviet nuclear 
materials and make sure that Russian nuclear workers are well 
paid or provided with other jobs.   This program has 
progressed slowly because of inadequate funding and political 
support.  When he took office in 2000, Bush actually tried to 
reduce its funding.  Since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, funding has been increased to $1 billion annually.  
This is only a tiny fraction of the amount so far squandered 
on the war with Iraq, a country without nuclear weapons or 
materials [10].

New nuclear weapons
Rather than reducing the role of nuclear weapons in post-cold 
war US military strategy, the Bush administration seeks 
significant new roles for them.  Bush wants to develop new 
nuclear weapons with lower explosive yield for roles that 
would include the destruction of biological and chemical 
weapons facilities and deeply buried hardened bunkers.  A new 
earth penetrating bomb would burrow into the ground due to 
the force of impact before detonating.  The underground 
detonation would convey a portion of the force of the 
explosion through the ground, destroying deep underground 
bunkers [11].    The new plan may include the use of nuclear 
weapons against countries that don’t have their own nuclear 
weapons; something which the US previously promised it 
wouldn’t do [9, 11, 12].   The administration wants to 
develop a new “modern pit facility” to manufacture the 
plutonium and enriched uranium cores of new nuclear weapons.  
Since 1992, the US has maintained a moratorium on nuclear 
weapons testing.  The Bush Administration seeks to reduce the 
time necessary to resume nuclear testing, as a possible first 
step towards ending this moratorium [13, 14]. 
“The barely concealed premise of this emerging nuclear 
doctrine is a desire to make US nuclear weapons more 
useable”, wrote William Hartung of the World Policy 
Institute.   “This dubious proposition is grounded in the 
notion that a low yield weapon could more readily be used as 
a threat, or actually dropped on a target, without sparking 
nuclear retaliation by another nuclear power” [15].  
Independent experts question administration claims that low 
yield weapons would limit civilian casualties and make the 
new weapons more usable.  No feasible “bunker buster” could 
penetrate deeply enough to contain a nuclear explosion 
underground [11, 16].  To destroy deeply buried targets a 
“bunker buster” might need 25 times the explosive yield of 
the Hiroshima bomb.  Such a bomb would blast a huge crater 
and hurl millions of cubic feet of radioactive material into 
the air.  This material could be dangerous for years and 
might be spread over a large area by prevailing winds [13, 
14, 17].  Many potential adversaries deliberately establish 
command bunkers and other sensitive facilities inside, near, 
or beneath areas heavily populated by civilians.  A nuclear 
bunker buster or other low yield weapon used in such 
circumstances would kill or injure enormous numbers of 
civilians.  A nuclear explosion would not necessarily render 
biological or chemical weapons harmless, and might instead 
release them into the environment, further increasing 
casualties [13, 18].
New nuclear weapons would need to be tested.  The nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commits countries without 
nuclear weapons not to get them, and countries with nuclear 
weapons to work for nuclear disarmament.   All but four 
countries in the world (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North 
Korea, which recently withdrew) have ratified the NPT.  The 
treaty forms the basis for the system of inspections, 
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, that 
insures compliance by non-nuclear countries [19].  Many 
nations agreed to an indefinite extension of NPT in 1995 on 
the explicit condition that the US and other nuclear powers 
would not resume nuclear tests and would fulfill their 
commitment to work towards nuclear disarmament.  A US 
decision to test new nuclear weapons would dramatically 
undermine NPT and destroy its companion, the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [17].  The CTBT would prohibit all 
nuclear test explosions.  The US Senate hasn’t ratified this 
treaty despite the fact that France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, Russia and a total of 97 nations had done so 
by 2003, and China promised it would ratify if the US did.  
The Bush administration opposes the treaty.  A resumption of 
nuclear testing by the US would likely unleash a new round of 
testing by China, India, Pakistan, and Russia.  Countries 
seeking to acquire nuclear weapons would feel emboldened to 
conduct tests of their own [13].  The US doctrine of 
pre-emptive war, demonstrated in Iraq, provides a powerful 
incentive for countries that fear US attack, such as North 
Korea, to seek a nuclear deterrent [9].

Ballistic missile defense
Besides offensive nuclear weapons, deploying a system to 
protect against nuclear missile attacks is the other 
cornerstone of Bush nuclear policy [20, 21].   Republicans 
have been obsessed with missile defense since Ronald Reagan, 
with only limited scientific advice, called for the 
development of a “Star Wars” missile shield twenty years ago 
[22].  The current incarnation of National Missile Defense 
(NMD) is a more limited ground launched system intended to 
defend against a few warheads launched by a “rogue state” 
towards the US.  With $90 billion spent so far, the technical 
problems involved are still formidable and unsolved [23].  
Using just a few minutes sensor data, an interceptor missile 
must be launched on a precise trajectory to propel a “kill 
vehicle” to collide with an incoming warhead moving through 
outer space ten times faster than a bullet from a gun [23, 
24].  Countermeasures that could fool ground based and “kill 
vehicle” sensors are cheap, simple and numerous.  They 
include launching lightweight decoys along with the warhead, 
tethering a balloon to it, and many others.  The means to 
defeat such countermeasures would be complicated and 
expensive, if possible at all [25].  Missile defense is a 
different sort of problem than some difficult technological 
problems that Americans take pride in having successfully 
solved in the past.  Landing astronauts on the moon, for 
example, was a problem of fixed difficulty. The moon wasn’t 
constantly devising new countermeasures to stop the 
astronauts. 
Bush is rushing to operationally deploy the first missile 
interceptors before the November election, with up to 20 
interceptors to be deployed in Alaska and California by the 
end of 2005 [24].   This is despite the fact that the 
interceptors have so far undergone only limited testing under 
highly artificial conditions, and that they nevertheless 
failed in three of eight such tests.  The system has no 
demonstrated capacity to intercept a warhead under realistic 
conditions where the characteristics of the warhead, its 
trajectory, and its time of launch are all unknown [25].  
Bush administration claims that the system would provide an 
effective defense have no basis in scientific evidence.  The 
long term plan to make the system effective against even a 
small number of warheads is to add additional layers capable 
of intercepting the attacking warhead or missile at various 
stages in its flight.  Sea based, air based, and space based 
interceptors would be added at a cost conservatively 
estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars [24].  The big 
four weapons contractors, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, 
and TRW stand to profit handsomely from this project [15].
	The supposed purpose of NMD is to protect the US against 
missile attacks by “rogue states” such as North Korea, Libya, 
Iran and, formerly, Iraq [26].  The target readiness date was 
based on a scenario developed in 1997 in which North Korea 
was seen as capable of developing an intercontinental missile 
in eight years.  In fact, North Korea abandoned its missile 
program two years before the scenario was created [23].  It 
has also expressed willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons 
program in exchange for a US promise not to attack it, 
something which the Bush administration refuses to grant.  
Libya recently abandoned its nuclear weapons program.    A 
recent study concluded that any nation technically capable of 
developing long range missiles could also develop 
countermeasures capable of defeating the fully deployed NMD 
system [26].   China currently has a small nuclear deterrent 
force consisting of only 20 long range missiles.  Were China 
convinced that the American system posted any threat to its 
nuclear deterrent, it might seek to overwhelm the system by 
increasing its number of deployed nuclear missiles. This 
might, in turn, cause India and Pakistan to do likewise.  
South Asia is already one of the world’s most unstable areas.  
	Ballistic missiles are not a likely means for a developing 
nation or terrorist group to use in attacking the US.   
Besides being expensive and complicated, ballistic missiles 
can be tracked.  The party guilty of the attack could be 
readily determined and would undoubtedly face devastating 
retaliation.  A discreet attacker is far more likely to 
smuggle a nuclear weapon into the US in the hold of a ship or 
the bed of a truck  [23].

What can I do?
1. VOTE BUSH OUT!
2.  Stay informed about nuclear weapons issues
visit the websites of:
The Union of Concerned Scientists www.ucsusa.org
Friends Committee on National Legislation www.fcnl.org
Nuclear Notebook of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nukenotes.html
Nuclear Reduction/Disarmament Initiative
www.nrdi.org/forpeopleoffaith.htm
3. write letters to newspapers, to your senators and 
representatives, and to the administration
	
References

1.	Husain, K., Neocons: the men behind the curtain. Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists, 2003. 56(6): p. 62-71.
2.	Chomsky, N., Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for 
Global Dominance. 2003, New York: Metropolitan Books. 278.
3.	Ikenberry, G.J., America's Imperial Ambition. Foreign 
Affairs, 2002. 81(5): p. 44-60.
4.	Bush, G.W., The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, 
2002.
5.	Norris, R.S., et al., NRDC Nuclear Notebook  U. S. Nuclear 
forces 2002. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2002(May/June): 
p. 70-75.
6.	Blair, B.G., et al., Toward True Security: A US Nuclear 
Posture for the Next Decade. 2001: Federation of American 
Scientists, Natural Resource Defense Council, Union of 
Concerned Scientists. 42.
7.	UCS, Global Security Backrounder: The Moscow Treaty. Union 
of Concerned Scientists website, 2003: p. 
www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/page.cfm?pageI
D=1134.
8.	Ciarrocca, M., The Nuclear Posture Review: Reading Between 
the Lines. Common Dreams News Center, 2002: p. 
www.commondreams.org/views02/0117-10.htm.
9.	Gottfried, K., President Bush's Nuclear Weapons Policy:  
Illogical, Ineffective, and Dangerous. Union of Concerned 
Scientists website, 2003 
www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/page.cfm?pageI
D=1106.
10.	Gottfried, K., A Ticking Nuclear Time Bomb. Union of 
Concerned Scientists website
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/page.cf
m?pageID=1181, 2003.
11.	Gronlund, L. and D. Wright, Earth Penetrating Weapons: 
Union of Concerned Scientists Backgrounder.  
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/page.cf
m?pageID=777.
12.	Bunn, G., et al., Experts letter to President Bush: the 
NPR. Union of Concerned Scientists website
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/page.cf
m?pageID=843, 2002.
13.	Briefing Book on Building a New Generation of American 
Nuclear Weapons. 2003: Center for Arms Control and 
Non-Proliferation.
14.	Kucia, C. and D. Kimball, Arms Control Association Issue 
Brief: New Nuclear Policies, New Weapons, New Dangers. 2003: 
Arms Control Association www.armscontrol.org.
15.	Hartnung, W.D., Bush's Nuclear Doctrine: From MAD to 
NUTS. Foreign Policy in Focus  
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org, 2000.
16.	Nelson, R., Low-Yield Earth Penetrating Weapons (Science 
and Global Security). 
http://www.princeton.edu/globsec/publications/pdf/10_1Nelson.
pdf.
17.	Drell, S., R. Jeanloz, and Peurifoy, A Strategic Choice: 
New Bunker Busters vs. Non-Proliferation (Arms Control 
Today). 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/drelletal_mar03.asp.
18.	May, M. and Z. Haldeman, Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons 
Against  Buried Biological Agent targets (Center for Security 
and International Cooperation). 
http://cisac.stanford.edu/research/inprogress/mayhalderman.ht
ml.
19.	Non-Proliferation Treaty- Brief background, in United 
Nations website. p. http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty.
20.	Newhouse, J., The Missile Defense Debate. Foreign 
Affairs, 2001. 80(4): p. 97-109.
21.	Newhouse, J., Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the 
World Order. 2003, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
22.	Ball, G.W., The War for Star Wars. The New York Review of 
Books, 1985. 32(6).
23.	Freeman, R., National Missile Defense: The Secrets the 
Pentagon Doesn't Want You to Know. Common Dreams News Center
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0520-11.htm, 2004.
24.	Twenty years of "Star Wars": Big Budgets but Little 
Progress. Global Security Backgrounder, Union of Concerned 
Scientists website
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/page.cf
m?pageID=1140.
25.	Technical Realities: An Analysis of the 2004 deployment 
of a U. S. National Missile Defense System. Union of 
Concerned Scientists report
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/page.cf
m?pageID=1403.
26.	Wright, D.C. An Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threats. 
in The Missile Threat and Plans for Ballistic Missile 
Defense: Technology, Strategic Stability, and Impact on 
Global Security. 2001. Rome, Italy: Union of Concerned 
Scientists report
http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet?NMD/wright.pdf.

__________________________________________________________________
Dr. Paul Patton
Research Scientist
Beckman Institute  Rm 3027  405 N. Mathews St.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  Urbana, Illinois 61801
work phone: (217)-265-0795   fax: (217)-244-5180
home phone: (217)-344-5812
homepage: http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/ppatton/www/index.html

"The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious.  It is the
source of all true art and science."
-Albert Einstein
__________________________________________________________________
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